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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 forbids an employer to retaliate against any
employee because that worker "opposed" unlawful
discrimination. The question presented is:
Does section 704(a) prohibit retaliation against a
worker because of the worker's statements:
(1) only when the statements are made to
the worker's own employer or to federal or
state anti-discrimination agencies (the rule
in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits), or
(2) also when the worker's statements are
made to any other person (the rule in the
First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth
Circuits)?

ii
PARTIES
The petitioner is Sara C. Debord. The respondent
is the Mercy Health System of Kansas, Inc.
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1
Petitioner Sara C. Debord respectfully prays that
this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals entered on November 26, 2013.
♦
OPINIONS BELOW
The November 26, 2013 opinion of the court of
appeals, which is reported at 737 F.3d 642 (10th Cir.
2013), is set out at pp. la-34a of the Appendix. The
March 20, 2012 opinion of the district court, which is
reported at 860 F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Kan. 2012), is set
out at pp. 35a-73a of the Appendix. The January 16,
2014 order of the court of appeals denying rehearing
en banc, which is not reported, is set out at p. 74a of
the Appendix.
♦
JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered
on November 26, 2013. On January 16, 2014, the
court of appeals denied a timely petition for rehearing
en banc. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees ... because he has opposed
any practice, made an unlawful employment
practice by this title, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
♦
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents an important issue regarding
the scope of section 704(a) of Title VII, which protects
workers

from

retaliation

because

they

"opposed"

unlawful discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009), this Court
adopted a broad view of when the content of an employee's statement would constitute "opposition" to
discrimination, and thus be accorded protection from
retaliation. The statements in Crawford had been
made by the plaintiff to her employer. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Alito noted that a distinct question
regarding the scope of the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII would be raised by a statement about discrimination made by an employee to co-workers (or

3
others),1 rather than to his or her employer. 555 U.S.
at 282-83. This case presents that issue.
(1)

From 2004 to 2009 Sara Debord worked in

the radiology department of Mercy Hospital in Independence, Kansas ("Mercy"). Her supervisor throughout

this

period

was

Leonard

Weaver,

who

was

married to one of the hospital's chief surgeons.
Weaver ... would often say to Plaintiff and
her co-workers "feel my cold hands," then
touch the employees' upper arms or the back
of their necks. One employee told Weaver
"don't touch me." ... [S]everal said, "your
hands are cold, get them off me." Plaintiff's
response was to pull away. Weaver would
sometimes rub Plaintiff's back, and she
would tell him "Stop, that hurts," although it
didn't hurt. Weaver touched Plaintiff approximately three times a week.
(App. 37a; see App. 3a). Three other female Mercy
employees in the radiology department described
being touched in this manner by Weaver. (App. 14a).
"Weaver ... admitted to occasionally touching [Debord]
and other employees on the arm to show them
how cold his hands were." (App. 7a). "Weaver claims
he was just trying to show [Debord] how unusually

^ Ä statement made to the EEOC or a state or local antidiscrimination agency would at least ordinarily be protected by
the-provision-of section 704(a) applying to participation in a
proceeding under Title VII.

4
cold his hands were, but Debord says the touching
was sexual harassment." (App. 3a). "Debord also says
Weaver frequently made offensive sexual comments
and advances, such as pulling down the neck of
her shirt while she was leaning over a patient, asking
her to show him her chest, and using sexually suggestive language when she wore certain clothing." (App.
3a).2

2 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, 13-14:
In 2004, Weaver asked DeBord if he could see her
breasts.... He asked her a half dozen times.... She said
no.... In 2004, Weaver asked "If no one would ever find
out would you ever consider sleeping with someone
like me." ... DeBord said no.... In 2004, Weaver was
assisting DeBord with laying down a patient and as
DeBord was bent over toward Weaver, he pulled the
neck of her shirt down to look down her shirt.... She
said don't ever do that again.... In 2006, DeBord was
wearing jeans and Weaver said "I didn't notice in
scrubs but you have a really nice butt." ... DeBord responded by never wearing jeans again.... In April
2009, DeBord was shutting the door to change into
her gym clothes and Weaver walked by and said "can I
watch?".... In June, 2009, Debord was leaning over her
computer and Weaver came up behind her and said
"your butt looks good. I almost slapped it.".... DeBord
said "don't ever do it".... This occurred one month before her termination.... Weaver would sometimes rub
DeBord's back and she would tell him that hurts and
to stop even though it did not hurt.
When a Mercy official asked Weaver whether he had remarked
to a female employee that he "would like to slap" her on the
bottom, Weaver "said he could not confirm saying that but he
(Continued on following page)
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On July 6, following an incident during which
Weaver hugged her, Debord posted on her Facebook
page her objection to Weaver's actions, commenting
that Weaver "needs to keep his creapy [sic] hands to
himself" (App. 4a-38a; CAApp. 284).3 Debord's Facebook page was accessible to her Facebook "friends,"
who included several co-workers.4 The parties disagree about whether such a communication to coworkers and friends is protected by section 704(a) a
disagreement that tracks a well-defined split in the
Courts of Appeals. Another posting that day stated
that Weaver had improperly approved an overpayment to Debord.
could not deny it either." (Court of Appeals Appendix ("CAApp.")
599) (Brewster notes of interview with Leonard Weaver).
3
Q. And in your Facebook posts, when you said "creepy
hands," were you intending to describe something
other than cold hands?
A. No. Just that it just gave me the creeps. I mean,
it was such an everyday thing that it got to where I
could be sitting somewhere and he would come into
the area and I wouldn't even have to look, my skin
would crawl.
App. 39a; CAApp. 472.
4

CA App. 599 (Brewster notes of interview with Leonard
Weaver):
Leonard said [Debord] put inappropriate comments on
FaceBook concerning him and was suspended for one
day. Leonard said he had a copy. I asked him how he
got a copy of her FaceBook page, didn't you have to be
designated as a "friend" to access FaceBook. He then
told me he received the copy from someone who had
access to "FaceBook" as a designated "friend" to the
co-worker FaceBook space.

6
At some point on July 6 Weaver learned that
Debord had posted her complaint about his "creepy
hands." Later that same day, when Debord was in a
meeting with Mercy's Human Resources director, Eric
Ammons, "Weaver interrupted the meeting to confront Debord about the posts." (App. 5a). Debord,
unwilling to confront her supervisor, initially denied
having posted the complaints. Weaver ultimately left
the room, but only after explicitly warning Debord in Ammons' presence - "Be careful what you say, it
will always come back to bite you." (CA App. 473).
Ammons ordered Debord to take down her Facebook
post about Weaver's "creepy hands," and she subsequently did so. (CAApp. 473).
On July 8, 2009, Ammons called Debord to his
office and told her she was being suspended without pay for a day because of the disputed Facebook
posts. The written reason for the suspension was as
follows:
Work related conduct needing improvement:
Failure to conduct yourself in a manner consistent with a high degree of personal integrity and professionalism which is expected of
Mercy co-workers. Engaged in behavior
deemed harmful to a fellow co-worker. Supporting details: See attached Facebook Documents. - During counseling Sara admitted
posting information on Facebook.
(App. 40a). The Facebook posts themselves were
attached to the suspension notice. (CA App. 291-92).
Also attached to the Corrective Action Form were two
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pages from the Mercy printed "Standards of Conduct,"
on which Ammons had underhned the following passage:
This [standard] not only involves sincere respect for the rights and feelings of others,
but also encourages that both in your business and your personal life you refrain from
any behavior that might be harmful to you,
your co-workers, and/or Mercy.
(CAApp. 289, 542). In Weaver's absence, Debord conceded to Ammons that she had posted the complaints
on her Facebook page. (CAApp. 466).
Prior to suspending Debord, Ammons did not ask
her for any details about the "creepy hands" complaint or make any effort to ascertain whether Weaver had indeed been touching Debord.
After Ammons informed Plaintiff of her suspension, he asked Plaintiff about the "creepy
hands" comment, and Plaintiff replied that
Weaver was a "perv." Ammons asked what
she meant by that, and plaintiff replied that
Weaver had made comments about her body
and would run his hands up inside the arm
of her scrubs and down the back neck of the
scrubs.
(App. 40a) (Emphasis added).
Later that same day, following her meeting with
Ammons, Debord sent a text message to one of her
female co-workers stating that "[Ammons] was calling
the techs ... asking about [Weaver's] conduct ... the
lewd comments and touching." (CA App. 302-03).
Debord sent the message to that particular co-worker

8
"[bjecause she knew how Leonard [Weaver] was so I
knew that she would understand."5 That co-worker
had at an earlier time resigned because of Weaver's
harassment, returning only on a part-time schedule
that would permit her to minimize any contact with
Weaver.6 That text message was one of the grounds
later cited by Mercy to explain its decision to dismiss
Debord. (CA App. 480). The parties disagree about
whether the text message constituted protected
activity. Mercy contends that after her meeting with
Ammons, Debord also discussed the harassment with
co-workers (CA App. 97),7 and cited those discussions
as a basis for her dismissal. The parties also disagree
about whether such discussions would be protected by
section 704(a). These disagreements mirror the
circuit split described below.
On July 9 Debord was interviewed by a second
Mercy official, and again described how she had been
harassed by Weaver.8 That official subsequently

5
6

CAApp. 468.

CA App. 619 (worker repeatedly touched by Weaver's
"creepy" hands), 620 (Weaver assaulted worker when she
dropped off her daughter to babysit for him), 621 (worker
resigned and returned to work only part time to avoid Weaver)
(Walsh dep.).
7
Whether Debord had such discussions with her co-workers
is disputed.
8
CA App. 597 (Brewster notes of interview with Sara
Debord):
I told Sara I had called her in to talk about a sexual
harassment compl[ai]nt. She said she did not file out
a sexual harassment compl[ai]nt. I asked if she had
(Continued on following page)

9
interviewed only one other female employee in the
radiology department.9 The official also met with
Weaver, and indicated in her notes that Weaver
"[wjanted to know when he was proven innocent what
would we do with Sara [Debold]. I told him all coworkers at Mercy have the freedom to report what
they perceive as harassment without any type of
punitive damage. I don't believe he was happy with
that response." (CA App. 599) (Brewster notes of
interview with Leonard Weaver).
Four days later, on July 13, 2013, Mercy dismissed Debord. The written Statement of Disciplinary Action provided only a short explanation of that
verbalized a compl[ai]nt to HR. She said yes. I asked
who it was against and she said Leonard Weaver.
I asked her about the environment in the department.
She said she really didn't know it was sexual harassment until someone told her and then she read up on
sexual harassment on the internet and thought maybe it was. Sara started crying. I gave her a Kleenex.
9
CA App. 598 (Brewster notes of interview with Kim
Harris):
Did she feel the Radiology Department environment
was hostile or any sexual tension in the department?
Kim said she pretty much stayed to herself. The department was pretty laid back and she wasn't in the
clique.
In the Department were there any lewd comments,
etc. She said the department was pretty open, joked
around, like most clinical departments, probably to let
off tension.
Kim brought up Sara and a FaceBook comment. I told
her I wasn't looking into the Facebook issue.

10
action: "Inappropriate and disruptive behavior. Dishonest." (App. 42a; CA App. 307). The dismissal
notice also stated: "Dates of conduct needing improvement:

Information

Received

(7/6-7/10)."

(CA

App. 307). July 6 was the date on which Debord had
posted on Facebook her complaint about Weaver's
"creepy hands." (The 11th and 12th of July were a
weekend). Ammons, who signed the notice of dismissal, told Debord that she was being dismissed in part
because she had been "dishonest ... about the sexual
harassment."

(CA App.

480).

Ammons

informed

Debord that the dismissal was also based on her
actions in sending text messages to a co-worker
referring to the investigation of her complaints concerning Weaver. (CA App. 543, 548, 668).
(2)

Debord filed suit in the district court, assert-

ing that she had been dismissed in retaliation for
actions protected by section 704(a) of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.10 After a period of discovery,
Mercy moved for summary judgment.
Mercy argued, inter alia, that Debord's Facebook
post was not protected activity under section 704(a),
because Debord had intended to communicate only to
her Facebook "friends" her objection to Weaver's
10

Debord also asserted a claim that Weaver's actions had
created a hostile work environment in violation of section 703(a)
of Title VII. The lower courts rejected that claim on several
grounds, and Debord does not seek review by this Court of the
dismissal of her sexual harassment claim. (App. 10a-22a, 47a58a).

11
"creepy hands," and had not acted with any purpose
to notify her employer about the problems. "The Facebook posts are not protected opposition.... DeBord
intended these posts only for her friends.... They are
not protected activity. Hine v. Extremity Imaging
Partners, ... 2011 WL ... 765853, at *9 (S.D.Ind. Feb.
25, 2011) (griping with friends and co-workers is not
statutorily protected activity)." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
23 (capitalization omitted). If, as Mercy contended,
section 704(a) does not protect communications to
"friends and co-workers," Debord's text message about
Weaver would also be unprotected under section
704(a), because it was sent to a co-worker, not to management officials as would Debord's discussion with coworkers about the sexual harassment.
The district court granted summary judgment
without resolving whether the Facebook post, text
message or discussion were protected activity.
(3) On appeal the Tenth Circuit held that
neither the Facebook post about alleged sexual harassment nor the text message or discussion about
that harassment were protected activity.11
The court of appeals concluded that Mercy had
offered six different "stated reasons" for terminating
Debord: (1) "posting inflammatory material about her
11

Mercy contended, as it had in the district court, that
nothing Debord had said or done in connection with the harassment was protected by section 704(a). Appellee/Cross-Appellant's
Principal and Response Brief, 33 n.4.

12
supervisor

on

the

internet,"

which

included

the

complaint about Weaver's "creepy hands," (2) "discussing

the
12

others,"

...

harassment

investigation[]

with

(3) "discussing the overpay ... investiga-

tion[] with others," (4) "sending text-messages to coworkers bad mouthing her supervisor (unrelated to
the

alleged

sexual

harassment),"

(5)

"knowingly

pocketing overpayment in 2007," and (6) "thrice lying
about posting information on Facebook while

at

work." (App. 24a). Debord contended that the first
and second of these "stated reasons" were facially
unlawful; the court of appeals held that neither the
Facebook post nor the text message to or discussions
with a co-worker were protected by section 704(a).
The Tenth Circuit rejected "Debord's ... argumente] • •• [that] Ammons could not lawfully terminate her for using Facebook to air her complaints."
(App. 24a). In its initial decision to suspend Debord,
Mercy had explained that her Facebook complaint
about Weaver - her objection to being touched by his
"creepy hands" - was being punished because it was
"deemed harmful to a fellow-co-worker" (App. 40a);
the "fellow co-worker" "harm[ed]" by the allegation of
sexual harassment was, of course, the alleged sexual
harasser. The court of appeals concluded that Mercy
was entitled to punish Debord for such a statement
on her Facebook page about Weaver. "She admits
12

The court of appeals' analysis encompassed both the text
message and the asserted verbal communications about the
harassment.

13
posting inflammatory material about her supervisor
on the internet...." (App. 24a). The panel reasoned
that Debord's "inflammatory" accusation of sexual
harassment was not protected because it was made
on Facebook, rather than being directed instead to
Mercy's officials. "Her Facebook post was not in
accordance with Mercy's otherwise flexible reporting
system for sexual harassment complaints and the
post, by itself, did not provide any notice to Mercy.
Only when Weaver himself brought the post to
Ammons's attention did Mercy learn that ... Debord
disliked Weaver's 'creepy hands.'" (App. 26a). That
was consistent with Mercy's contention that section
704(a) only protects sexual harassment complaints
directed to an employer itself, and not to "griping
with friends and co-workers."
The court of appeals also rejected "Debord's ...
argument[] ... [that] Ammons could not lawfully
terminate her for communicating with others about
the pending investigations." (App. 24a). The panel
concluded that Mercy was entitled to fire Debord if
she violated a company policy that prohibited a victim
of sexual harassment from disclosing the existence of
any investigation of that harassment. The panel believed that Mercy's policies indeed required Debord to
remain silent about her harassment complaint. "She
admits ... discussing the ... harassment investigations
with others." (App. 23a). "[I]nstead of trying to gather
evidence, Debord's text messages merely shared
information with co-workers about an investigation
that company policy dictates should be confidential....
and one period Mercy's confidential-investigation rule
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was not generated after the fact. In fact, the rule is
stated in Mercy's harassment training materials."
(App. 29a).
Because the court of appeals held that the Facebook post, the text message, and the discussion with
co-workers were all unprotected by section 704(a), it
did not reach the question of whether a reasonable
jury could conclude that Debord would not have been
fired but for those activities.
The court of appeals, while rejecting Debord's
claim that her Facebook post and text message were
protected activity, also addressed a third issue,
whether Debord had been dismissed for having
directly told Mercy officials (in response to their
questions) about the harassment. Mercy acknowledged that a complaint about sexual harassment if
made directly to a company official could constitute
protected activity, but denied having dismissed
Debord because of the complaint made to Mercy
itself. The Tenth Circuit noted that Mercy had articulated a number of lawful alternative reasons for the
dismissal, not only the Facebook Post and text message (which the appellate court held were permissible
reasons for firing Debord), but also several matters
not related to the harassment.13 The court of appeals
13

Those other, non-harassment-related matters raised a
number of factual disputes. For example, with regard to Mercy's
original explanation that it had fired Debord for lying about
having been overpaid, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged - as
Mercy itself had by this point in the litigation - that there had
indeed been such an overpayment. The court of appeals believed,
(Continued on following page)
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concluded that these various alternative reasons were
not a pretext to cover up an intent to fire Debord
because she had complained directly to Mercy. (App.
22a-23a).
Debord petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing
that the panel had erred in holding that her Facebook
post, text message and discussion about sexual harassment - directed at friends or co-workers rather
than to her employer - were not protected by section
704(a). The court of appeals denied rehearing.
♦
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Section 704(a) of Title VII protects workers from
retaliation because they "opposed" unlawful discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
this Court addressed the issue of what content of a
worker's statement would constitute "opposition" to

however, that Mercy's officials were simply unaware, when they
assertedly fired Debord for allegedly lying about this matter,
that their own records demonstrated there had been an overpayment. Mercy's reliance on this purported falsehood on the
part of Debord, the appellate court believed, was merely the
result of "negligence, forgetfulness or confusion - not intentional
ignorance to hide a retaliatory motive," and did not demonstrate
that Mercy actually was retaliating against Debord for having
told Mercy officials directly about the harassment.
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discrimination, and thus be accorded protection from
retaliation. This case presents the distinct issue noted but not directly resolved in Crawford - of
whether section 704(a) protects statements made to
persons other than a worker's own employer.
Justice Alito noted in a concurring opinion in
Crawford that "[t]he question whether the opposition
clause shields employees who do not communicate
their views to their employers through purposive
conduct is not before us in this case; the answer to
that question is far from clear; and I do not understand the Court's holding to reach that issue here."
555 U.S. at 283. Justice Alito suggested in that opinion that applying section 704(a) to statements made
to co-workers or friends would raise issues not posed
by protecting statements to employers. 555 U.S. at
282. Several circuit courts have noted that this Court's
decision in Crawford left that issue unresolved.14
Workers concerned about sexual harassment or
other possible discrimination frequently discuss those
issues with fellow employees, friends, relatives, or
others. The question not posed by the circumstances
in Crawford — but presented by the instant case thus arises frequently. While serving on the Second
and Third Circuits, respectively, then Judge Sotomayor
wrote an opinion addressing that issue15 and then
14

Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 47
(1st Cir. 2010); Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567
F.3d 804, 812 (2009) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S.Ct.
863 (2011).
15
Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000).

17
Judge Alito joined another such opinion.16 The same
issue has been addressed by the lower courts under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,17 the
Americans With Disabilities Act,18 and the Rehabilitation Act,19 and the Family and Medical Leave Act,20
and Title IX.21

I.

THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE SHARPLY DIVIDED ABOUT WHETHER SECTION
704(a) PROTECTS STATEMENTS BY A
WORKER TO PERSONS OTHER THAN
THE WORKER'S OWN EMPLOYER

The Fourth and Tenth Circuits hold that section
704(a) does not protect statements made by a worker
to persons other than the worker's employer, the view

16

Neiderlander v. American Video Glass Company, 80
Fed.Appx. 256 (3d Cir. 2003).
17

Woodsford v. Friendly Ford, 2012 WL 2521041 (D.Nev.
June 27, 2012); Barber v. CSX Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 594,
702 (3d Cir. 1995); Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d
1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989); Chapin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,
2007 WL 915182 at *8 (S.D.Ohio March 26, 2007).
18
McMahan v. UMG Mfg. & Logistics, Inc., 2008 WL
906152 (S.D.Ind. March 31, 2008).
19

Montanye v. Wissahickon School Dist., 218 Fed.Appx. 126,
131 (3d Cir. 2007); Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631
F.Supp.2d 564, 580 (M.D.Pa. 2009).
20
Fields v. F airfield County Bd. of Developmental Disabilities, 507 Fed.Appx. 549 (6th Cir. 2012); Mondaine v. American
Drug Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 626045 at *3 (D.Kan. Jan. 26, 2006).
21
Condiff v. Hart County School Dist., 770 F.Supp. 876, 882
(W.D.Ky. 2011).
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advanced in the courts below by Mercy. The First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, on the
other hand, hold that section 704(a) does apply to
such statements. Debord's Facebook post and text
message, and discussion of the harassment with coworkers, would have been protected activity if they
had occurred in any of the six circuits that interpret
section 704(a) more broadly. Whether a worker can
safely discuss concerns about discrimination with coworkers or friends, indeed whether a victim of sexual
harassment can even reveal that abuse to her or his
spouse, depends on the circuit in which the worker is
employed.
(1)

The Tenth Circuit held that Debord's Face-

book post about sexual harassment was not protected
by section 704(a) because it "was not in accordance
with Mercy's otherwise flexible reporting system for
sexual harassment complaints and the post, by itself,
did not provide any notice to Mercy." (App. 26a). Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that Debord's
text message and discussion about the sexual harassment investigation were not protected because
they "merely shared information with co-workers."
(App. 29a). Those holdings were consistent with
Mercy's contention that "griping with friends and coworkers is not statutorily protected activity."
The Fourth Circuit adopted the same narrow
interpretation of section 704(a) in Pitrolo v. County of
Duncome, NC, 2009 WL 1010634 (4th Cir. March 11,
2009). In that case, after the plaintiff applied for a
county job, a county official "reported to Pitrolo that
there was opposition to hiring her ... because of her
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gender.... Pitrolo promptly informed her father ... of
[the] statement; in response, her father contacted a
[local business organization] and complained of discrimination.... Ultimately, the [county] learned about
these allegations." 2009 WL 1010634 at *1 (footnote
omitted). Pitrolo claimed that the county subsequently rejected her application because she had reported
the discriminatory remark to her father. The Fourth
Circuit held that Pitrolo's complaint about discrimination was not protected activity under section 704(a)
because she had made her statements to her father,
not to her prospective employer.
Pitrolo's statements to her father do not
qualify as protected activity under § 2000e3(a). There is no evidence that Pitrolo intended for her father to pass along her
complaints to Defendants.... Pitrolo did not
communicate her belief to her employer and
was not attempting to bring attention to the
alleged discriminatory conduct. Instead,
Pitrolo told her father of [the] statements because she was "close to [her] father" and "it
was something that was very important that
was going on in [her] life at the time." ... As
noted by the district court, it would not be
reasonable to characterize a private complaint to a close family member as an "informal grievance procedure" under Laughlin
[u. Metro Washington Airports Auth., 149
F.3d 153, 259 (4th Cir. 1998)].... Since
Pitrolo's statement to her father was not protected activity, her retaliation claim fails.
2009 WL 1010634 at *3 (footnote omitted). The
Fourth Circuit relied on Justice Alito's assertion in
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Crawford that the majority opinion in that case
permitted such a limitation on the scope of section
704(a). "We do not read Crawford ... to affect our
analysis.... As Justice Alito noted, Crawford does not
extend to cases where employees do not communicate
their views to their employers through purposeful
conduct." 2009 WL 1010634 at *3 n.6. Although the
Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo is not officially
reported, it has repeatedly been applied by district
courts in that circuit.22
(2)

Six circuits hold to the contrary that the

protection of the opposition clause in section 704(a) is
not limited to statements made to a worker's own
employer.
The Second Circuit has concluded that
[i]n addition to protecting the filing of formal
charges of discrimination, § 704(a)'s opposition clause protects as well informal protests
of discriminatory employment practices,
writing critical letters to customers, protesting discrimination by industry or by society
in general, and expressing support of coworkers who have filed formal charges.
Sumner v. United States Postal Service, 899 F.2d 203,
209 (2d Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit has repeatedly
affirmed this rule that section 704(a) applies to
complaints or other statements directed to persons
22

DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 2013 WL 5274505 at *7-*8
(W.D.Va. Sept. 17, 2013); Harris-Rogers v. Ferguson Enterprises,
2011 WL 4460574 at *1 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011).
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other than an employer's managers. Hubbard v. Total
Communications, 347 Fed.Appx. 679, 679 (2d Cir.
2009) (quoting Sumner); Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc.,
202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (opinion by
Sotomayor, J.); Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 78 (2d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sumner)-, Heller v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989); Grant v.
Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("as this choice of language clearly indicates, Congress sought to protect a wide range of
activity in addition to the filing of a formal complaint
... [such as] writing a letter to a customer of employer
... [or] boycotting and picketing of store....").
The Third Circuit noted that
[w]e have previously ... cited with approval
the Second Circuit's language in Sumner....
[P]ublic manifestations of disagreement with
illegal employment practices can be protected under the opposition clause.... [A] district
court held that an employee, who attended a
public meeting of students and parents organized for the express purpose of challenging
the allegedly discriminatory treatment of a
black teacher, engaged in protected opposition activity.... [In] Payne v. McLemore's
Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130
(5th Cir. 1981) ... the Fifth Circuit upheld a
district court conclusion that boycotting and
picketing activity was protected conduct ...
[because it] was directed at the employer's
allegedly discriminatory employment practice of withholding certain jobs from black
employees.

22
Curay-Cramer v.

Ursuline Academy of Wilmington,

Del, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2006).
Neiderlander v. American Video Glass Company, 80
Fed.Appx. 256 (3d Cir. 2003), an opinion joined by
then Judge Alito, specifically rejected an employer's
contention that section 704(a) does not protect an
employee who complains to co-workers.
Neiderlander told ... co-workers about her
displeasure with [a disputed promotion decision], alleging gender discrimination at
AVG.... The District Court found that
Neiderlander failed to establish the first
prong of her prima facie case because her informal complaints of gender discrimination
were directed to co-workers and not management. The Court ... concluded that this
did not constitute "protected activity." We believe that this interpretation of protected activity is too narrow.... As established in
Sumner, ... the opposition to discriminatory
practices need not be made directly to managers in order to constitute protected activity,
and Neiderlander's complaints to her coworkers, assuming they were communicated
to management, would be the type of opposition to discrimination that § 2000e-3(a) seeks
to protect.
80 Fed.Appx. at 260-61; see Hazen v. Modern Food
Services, Inc., 113 Fed.Appx. 442, 443 (3d Cir. 2004)
("informal complaints of discrimination that were
directed

at

co-workers

rather

than

management

constitute protected activity"); Abramson v. William
Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 287-88
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(3d Cir.

2001) (quoting Sumner); Barber v.

CSX

Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 594, 702 (3d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Sumner).
The earliest appellate decision on this issue is in
the Fifth Circuit, which held that section 704(a)
protects
persons

complaints
other

of discrimination

than

the

employer.

directed

to

Payne

v.

McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130,
1136-42 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). The plaintiff in that
case had organized a consumer boycott of several
retail

businesses,

including

the

store

where

he

worked on a seasonal basis, and was actively involved
in picketing one of those stores. 654 F.2d at 1134-35.
The boycott and picketing were directed at members
of the public; their purpose was to oppose the employer's discrimination in hiring and promotion. Id. at
1136. The district court held that the employer had
violated section 704(a) by refusing to rehire Payne
when it had vacancies, and the Fifth Circuit upheld
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1141.
The Sixth Circuit has expressly endorsed the
EEOC's interpretation of section 704(a) as extending
to a worker's expression to anyone of opposition to
unlawful discrimination.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... has identified a number of examples of "opposing" conduct which is protected
by Title VII, including complaining to anyone
(management, unions, other employees, or
newspapers) about allegedly unlawful practices.... EEOC Compliance Manual, (CCH)
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TI 8006.... Of critical import here is the fact
that there is no qualification on who the individual doing the complaining may be or on
the party to whom the complaint is made
known - i.e., the complaint may be made by
anyone and it may be made to a co-worker,
newspaper reporter, or anyone else....
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561,
579-80 (6th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted); see Fields v.
Fairfield County Bd. of Developmental Disabilities,
507 Fed.Appx. 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2012) ("an employee
may

complain

about

discrimination

to

anyone")

(quoting Johnson); Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services,
Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson); Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ., 359 Fed.Appx. 562,
571 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson); Niswander v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 721 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Johnson); Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of
Nashville and Davidson County, 211 Fed.Appx. 373,
375 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson), rev'd on other
grounds, 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
In EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d
1008 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit expressly
rejected the contention that section 704(a) protects
only statements of opposition that are made to an
employer itself.
Zellerbach argues strenuously that [plaintiff's] letter [objecting to discrimination],
whatever its content, cannot constitute protected opposition because it was delivered to
... an outside party, rather than a Zellerbach
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official. We find no persuasive authority to
support the proferred position.... Where the
recipient of the "opposition" message is an
ordinary public official or a customer of the
employer, Zellerbach maintains, the expression is not statutory opposition. But [the
Fifth Circuit decision in] Payne is to the contrary.
In that case, the plaintiff's opposition to
discriminatory practices was expressed by
participation in a boycott and in picketing
designed to convey a message to customers
and the public as well as the employer.... The
court held that... the plaintiff... successfully
demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination prohibited by the opposition clause of
section 704(a)....
720 F.2d at 1014.
The First Circuit has adopted the same broad
reading of section 704(a). Concetta v. National Hair
Care Centers, Inc., 236 F.3d 67 (1st. Cir. 2001). "Expressing opposition to harassment to management ...
or 'anyone else/EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-II.B.2
(May 20, 1998) is protected conduct...." 236 F.3d at 76;
see Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 32
(1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Sumner).
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II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
INCORRECTLY AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL ANTI-RETALIATION
LAW
The Tenth Circuit decision in the instant case

and the Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo are inconsistent with this Court's decision in Crawford. Although the statements at issue in Crawford had been
made to the worker's employer, Crawford's broad
definition of "oppose" was not limited to statements
made to any particular person. " 'Oppose' goes beyond
'active, consistent' behavior in ordinary discourse,
where we would naturally use the word to speak of
someone who has taken no action at all to advance a
position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were
known to 'oppose' slavery before Emancipation, or are
said to 'oppose' capital punishment today, without
writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government." 555 U.S. at 277. The requirement that an individual's objection to some action be
"disclos[ed]" is satisfied without regard to the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made. Most
of the countless people who "were known to 'oppose'
slavery before Emancipation, or are said to 'oppose'
capital

punishment today,"

did

not express

that

opposition in statements to government officials. In
ordinary discourse an individual would be said to
oppose capital punishment if he or she posted an
objection to the death penalty on his or her Facebook
page, or criticized it in a text message. The disclosure
of a speaker's (or writer's) position is "opposition"
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under Crawford so long as it is "an ostensibly disapproving account." 555 U.S. at 276. In the instant case
Debord's

description

of the

harasser's

hands

as

"creepy," and of his remarks and touching as "lewd,"
obviously manifested the disapproval deemed sufficient under Crawford.
The Tenth Circuit thought Debord's statements
fell outside the scope of section 704(a) because they
were

not "in

flexible

accordance

reporting

system

with
for

Mercy's
sexual

otherwise

harassment

complaints." (App. 26a). But section 704(a) is not
limited to "report[s]" that are "in accordance with [an
employer's] reporting system," but extends far more
broadly to "oppos[ition]" to sexual harassment or
other unlawful practices. The section 704(a) protection of workers

who "opposed"

discrimination is

palpably and deliberately broader than the antiretaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which forbids only retaliation against a worker for
having "filed any complaint." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
Protection

of complaint-filing

at

least

ordinarily

would require that the complaint be made to an
employer or government official. See Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325,
1335 (2011) ("to fall within the scope of the antiretaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently
clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an
assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call
for their protection"). Similarly, the alternative language of section 704(a), forbidding retaliation against
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a worker because he or she "filed a charge," envisions
a statement made to a particular entity, the EEOC or
other appropriate anti-discrimination agency. Federal
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008)
("if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take
remedial action to protect the employee's rights....").
But the Tenth Circuit assuredly erred in imposing a
similar limitation on the differently-phrased prohibition barring retaliation against a worker who "opposed" discrimination.
Like the limitation on section 704(a) rejected by
this Court in Crawford, the Tenth Circuit rule has
indefensibly

peculiar

consequences.

The

court

of

appeals suggested that Debord would have been
protected if in her contacts with other workers she
had been "trying to gather evidence." (App. 29a). On
that view Debord could not have been fired if, for
example, she had specifically asked other female employees if they too had been harassed by Weaver; as
the court of appeals noted, proof of widespread harassment would have established a basis for holding
Mercy liable for that harassment. (App. 3la-15a). But
although, on the Tenth Circuit's view, Debord would
have been protected if she asked other workers about
harassment, under the court of appeals decision any
worker she queried could be fired for answering
Debord's questions (rather than using Mercy's reporting system to complain about harassment). And if, in
response to Debord's query, a worker inquired why
Debord was asking, Debord herself could not answer
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(e.g., could not tell the worker she was trying to shore
up the claim then being investigated by Mercy),
because doing so would have been disclosing information about an investigation. That is precisely the
type of "freakish rule" that this Court in Crawford
refused to read into section 704(a).23
The rule in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits has a
second implausible consequence. In order to establish
a claim of unlawful sexual harassment, an employee
must demonstrate that she subjectively perceived the
harassment as creating a hostile work environment.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
(1993).

Plaintiffs

frequently

510 U.S.

make

that

17, 21

showing,

rebutting defense contentions that they did not mind
the remarks or touching involved, by offering evidence that at the time of the harassment they complained about it to family or friends. In the Tenth and
Fourth Circuits, however, a harassment victim would
have to keep that harassment secret from friends or
family, thus potentially undermining her legal claim
under Title VII. And a woman who, mindful of the
risk of legally permissible retaliation, had initially

23

The distinction is all the more indefensible because one
worker's description of being sexually harassed could trigger a
similar statement by a fellow employee. E.g., Homesley v.
Freightliner Corp., 61 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Rita
Chitwood ... , [a co-worker], came to Homesley's welding booth
and saw her crying. Homesley told her of the sexual harassment
by Yarborough. Chitwood said Yarborough had been doing the
same thing to her and to Tona Collins").
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avoided telling her husband about being groped or
sexually assaulted at work, might well hesitate to
thereafter file a formal complaint or Title VII charge,
understanding that the

delay

in

disclosing that

sexual contact to her spouse could raise serious
problems in that relationship if her complaint or
charge later brought that harassment to the attention
of her spouse. "Nothing in the statute's text or [this
Court's] precedents supports this catch-22." Crawford, 555 U.S. at 853.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed Debord's text message - objecting to the harasser's remarks and actions

as

"lewd"

and

describing

the

anticipated

investigation — as "merely shar[ing] information with
co-workers." (App. 29a). But sharing information is
often a key method of opposing discrimination. For
example, in McMahan v. UMG Mfg. & Logistics, Inc.,
2008 WL 906152 (S.D.Ind. March 31, 2008), a worker
was fired for having warned a fellow employee that
he was being singled out for television monitoring
because of his disability. Applying the Second Circuit
decision in Grant and the Sixth Circuit decision in
Johnson, the district court in McMahan held this was
protected activity.24 In DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic,
u

2008 WL 906152 at 4 ("UMG argues that McMahan's
report to [a fellow employee] was not protected activity because
he did not communicate his complaint to company management.... Contrary to defendant's argument that McMahan is not
protected by law unless he complained to a manager, ... opposition encompasses 'complaints about the employer to others that
the employer learns about' ") (quoting 1 Barbara T. Lindemann
(Continued on following page)
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2013

WL

5274505

(W.D.Va.

Sept.

17,

2013),

"DeMasters told Doe that 'it appeared to [DeMasters]
that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment in violation

of

Carilion's

sexual

harassment

policy.'

...

DeMasters reviewed the steps of Carilion's sexual
harassment policy with Doe and suggested a plan to
report the harassment." 2013 WL 5274505 at *1.
Applying the Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo, the
district court in DeMasters held that this was not
protected

activity.25 A worker

often

would

never

realize that he or she was the victim of discrimination
in compensation unless other employees disclosed
what they were being paid. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 650 n.3 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[0]ne-third of private
sector employers have adopted specific rules prohibiting
employees

from

discussing their wages with

co-

workers."). Thompson v. North American Stainless,

& Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1013 (4th
ed. 2007)).
26
2013 WL 5274505 at *7 ("DeMasters' conversations with
Doe are not oppositional. DeMasters alleges that he told Doe
that Doe was a victim of sexual harassment and that Carillón
had mishandled Doe's complaints.... These statements were not
made to Carilion, but rather were.... provided to Doe.... Statements made by DeMasters to Doe ... cannot qualify as oppositional conduct"; "DeMasters' statements to Doe ... are not
protected oppositional activity. DeMasters did not make these
statements to his employer, Carilion. There is no suggestion the
DeMasters intended for Doe to pass his comments on to
Carihon.... As in Pitrolo, this does not qualify as protected
oppositional activity").
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LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011), held that the employer in
that case could not retaliate against Thompson in
reprisal for his fiancée's complaint about genderbased discrimination; but that unlawful retaliation
would probably never have come to light if the fiancée
had been forbidden to tell Thompson about her complaint.
The rule in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits creates
perverse incentives for employers. "To immunize an
employer from a retaliation complaint because one of
its supervisors has not heard directly from the employee encourages the employer not to ask the employee

about

complaints

of co-workers

...

or

to

immediately retaliate against the employee before he
or she can voice protected opposition directly to
superiors. In either case, the employer has thwarted
the purposes of the anti-retaliation laws." Mondaine
v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 626045 at *3
(D.Kan. Jan.

26, 2006) (citing the Third Circuit

decisions in Neiderlander and Hazen).

Often the

decision to file a formal internal complaint, or a Title
VII charge, will grow out of discussions with coworkers or family members;26 the effective suppression
26

See Condiff v. Hart County School Dist., 770 F.Supp. 876,
882 (W.D.Ky. 2011) ("when confronted with allegations of sexual
harassment of her stepdaughter [by a teacher], Plaintiff instructed her stepdaughter to document the incidents of sexual
harassment on Plaintiff's personal e-mail account, informed her
husband of the alleged harassment, forwarded the e-mail to her
husband, discussed the incident with her husband, instructed
(Continued on following page)
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of those exchanges could throttle complaints and
charges. For that reason, Woodsford v. Friendly Ford,
2012 WL 2521041 (D.Nev. June 27, 2012), refused to
"condone an employer's 'gag order' on all discriminationrelated workplace conversation. To do so ... could
produce a chilling effect that deters employees with
meritorious

claims

from

bringing

discrimination

suits." 2012 WL 2521041 at *9. And in Chapin v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 2007 WL 915182 at *18
(S.D.Ohio March 26, 2007), the court - citing the
Second Circuit decision in Sumner and the Third
Circuit decision in Neiderlander — held that the
ADEA does protect discussions with co-workers about
the possibility of filing a lawsuit under the ADEA. In
Harris-Rogers

v.

Ferguson

Enterprises,

2011

WL

4460574 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2011), after a co-worker
complained to Harris-Rogers that she was being
harassed by her supervisor, Harris-Rogers sent an
email to the co-worker urging her to file a complaint.
"Please consider contacting HQ, otherwise he will
continue

to

harass[]

you

on

everything....

[H]e

need[ ] s to feel a little more from HR, can't be harassing associates...." at *1. But in that case the district
court, bound by the Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo,

her husband to contact school officials regarding the harassment, and authorized him to forward the e-mail to school
officials describing the sexual harassment....").
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held that the suggestion that the co-worker file a
complaint was not protected activity.27
Congress could not have intended to permit such
preemptive retaliation, denying protection until a
worker filed a complaint with his or her employer, a
charge with the EEOC, or a lawsuit in federal or
state court. The basic purpose of retaliation is to
prevent aggrieved workers from opposing unlawful
discrimination in the first place; making an example
of a worker who already did so is only a means to that
end. An employer intent upon preventing formal
complaints or Title VII charges would be even more
likely to utilize a type of retaliation that might silence a worker before he or she had even taken that
step. Under Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998), an employer would be under an obligation
to investigate second-hand reports of sexual harassment, as indeed occurred in Crawford. 555 U.S. at
273. But under the decision below, as under the
Fourth Circuit decision in Pitrolo, an employer could
preemptively

squelch

those

inconvenient

rumors;

indeed, the decision below is likely to have just that
perverse effect.
27

2011 WL 4460574 at *7 ("[P]laintiff admits that she
intended to send the ... email solely to [the co-worker] and only
mistakenly sent it to a broader audience that included management personnel. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ... email
was sent with the intention of voicing opposition about Ferguson's employment policies, that is, to bring attention to any
purported discriminatory activities by Ferguson. The ... email
therefore does not qualify as opposition activity. Pitrolo....").
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It is equally inconceivable that Congress, having
undeniably extended protection to workers who file
internal complaints or EEOC charges, could have
intended to permit employers to muzzle discussion of
the manner in which those complaints or charges were
being handled. The purpose of protecting complaints
and charges is to correct the discrimination at issue;
exchanging information and even voicing criticism of
those processes can be vital to their effectiveness. In
Woodsford

v.

Friendly

Ford,

2012

WL

2521041

(D.Nev. June 27, 2012), "[plaintiff's supervisor] asked
that Woodsford not discuss his pay cut or the [EEOC]
charge with other [F]riendly employees. Woodsford
protested this, saying that his compensation change
and EEOC charge were 'absolutely everybody's business.'" 2012 WL 2521041 at *2. "The listed reasons
for suspending Woodsford [included] that ... he violated [his supervisor's] instruction not to discuss his
compensation reduction and the EEOC charge with
his co-workers...." The district court, citing the Second
Circuit decision in Grant and the Sixth Circuit decision in Johnson, held that Woodsford's discussion of
his discrimination claim and charge were protected
activity. "Defendant argues that Woodsford was not engaging in a protected activity under the opposition clause
when he spoke to non-management Friendly employees
while on the job in violation of Defendant's instructions
not to do so.... Friendly's instruction to Woodsford contradicts the plain language of [the anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA] ... 'Opposing1 an unlawful action
encompasses speaking to fellow employees about a
charge filed in opposition to the alleged discrimination."
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Woodsford v. Friendly Ford, 2012 WL 2521041 at *9
(emphasis in original). On the other hand, the court
in DeMasters, applying the contrary Fourth Circuit
rule in Pitrolo, held that the plaintiff was not protected
by section 704(a) when he told a harassment victim
that the employer "was mishandling [her] complaints."
DeMasters v. Carillon Clinic, 2013 WL 5274505 at *2.
The majority rule, interpreting section 704(a)
(and other similarly-phrased anti-retaliation provisions) to apply to statements of opposition made to
anyone, not merely to employers, has been the consistent interpretation of the EEOC. The EEOC characterizes as "[e]xamples of [opposition" protected by
section 704(a) and other statutes "[c]omplaining to
anyone

about

discrimination."

EEOC

Compliance

Manual section 8-II(B)(2).
A complaint or protest about alleged employment discrimination to a manager, union
official, co-worker, company EEO official, attorney, newspaper reporter, Congressperson,
or anyone else constitutes opposition.... Example 2 — C[harging]P[arty] complains to coworkers about harassment of a disabled
employee by a supervisor. This complaint
constitutes "opposition."
Id.-, see id.

at section 8-II(B)(3)(a) ("Courts have

protected an employee's right to inform an employer's
customers about the employer's alleged discrimination, as well as the right to engage in peaceful picketing to oppose allegedly discriminatory employment
practices"). "EEOC compliance manuals 'reflect "a

37
body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'"" Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276 (quoting Federal
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008)
and Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)).

III. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT
VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING THE QUESTION PRESENTED
This case presents an excellent vehicle for resolving the question presented. Because two assertedly
protected statements were in writing — one in a
Facebook post, and one in a text message — the exact
nature of those statements is clear, presenting a
highly concrete dispute. The precise date on which
Mercy learned of the statements is known, and there
is substantial contemporaneous evidence that Mercy
officials objected to all the statements.
The case presents two types of statements to coworkers.

First,

both

the

Facebook

Post

(about

"creepy" hands) and the text message (about "lewd"
remarks and actions) constitute the type of disapproving comment that would be sufficient under
Crawford. Second, the text message, in its reference
to the Mercy investigation and to Debord's expectation that a Mercy official would be questioning the
other women in the department, poses the question of
whether the protections for such statements about
the existence or handling of a discrimination complaint or charge are different than the protections
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accorded to objections to particular discriminatory
acts as such.
The court below noted that Mercy had advanced
"a number of reasons - unrelated to Debord's complaint of sexual harassment," to defend its decision to
dismiss her. (App. 28a). But Title VII does not require
a plaintiff to show that retaliation (or discrimination)
was the sole reason for a disputed termination or
other adverse action. Even where an employer also
had one or more other, lawful reasons for the action
complained of, the plaintiff will still prevail if she
demonstrates that an unlawful purpose (or two or
more such purposes in combination) was the but-for
cause of that action. University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013). If
this Court holds that the Facebook post, text message, or discussion related to sexual harassment were
indeed protected activity, Mercy will be free to argue
on remand that any reasonable jury would have to
find that Mercy would have dismissed Debord on
other, lawful grounds, even in the absence of such
protected activity. But because the Tenth Circuit believed that that Facebook post, the text message, and
discussion were all unprotected by section 704(a), it
had no occasion to reach that issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Opinion
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Sara Debord filed suit against her employer,
Mercy Health Services of Kansas, for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VIL Debord
claims Mercy knew or should have known that her
supervisor created a hostile workplace through unwanted touching and offensive sexual remarks. She
also claims that Mercy did not do enough to prevent
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sexual harassment in the workplace, and that, when
she finally reported the harassment, Mercy retaliated
by firing her.
After reviewing the evidence at summary judgment, the district court concluded there was no
triable issue of material fact. We agree. The record
does not disclose that Mercy knew or should have
known about Debord's allegations of a hostile workplace, and she has not provided a reasonable explanation for the nearly five years she waited to first
report the harassment. Nor is there a genuine dispute
about whether Mercy honestly held legitimate reasons for terminating Debord based on its conclusion
that she was dishonest and disruptive during Mercy's
investigation of allegations about her supervisor's
conduct and claims she improperly received extra pay.
Debord resists these conclusions with myriad arguments, but none is sufficiently developed or supported by the record to merit a trial.
Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we AFFIRM.1

I.

Background
Debord worked as a nuclear-medicine technician

at Mercy Hospital in Independence, Kansas. Debord's

1

Mercy also raises a cross-appeal for costs. On this issue,
we reverse the district court, as explained below.
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direct supervisor was Leonard Weaver, the hospital's
director of radiology.

A. Debord's Allegations of Sexual Harassment
Soon after Debord was hired in 2004, she contends her supervisor Weaver began regularly placing
his hands up her sleeve or down the back of her
shirt.2 According to Debord, this occurred "at least
three days a week." Aplt.App. 169. Weaver claims he
was just trying to show her how unusually cold his
hands were, but Debord says the touching was sexual
harassment. In any event, Debord did not tell Mercy's
management that Weaver was touching her until
July 2009.
Debord also says Weaver frequently made offensive sexual comments and advances, such as pulling
down the neck of her shirt while she was leaning over
a patient, asking her to show him her chest, and
using sexually suggestive language when she wore
certain clothing. Id. at 174-76. Although Debord told
Weaver to stop this behavior, she did not report the
misconduct to management.
2

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we recite the facts presented in the light most favorable to
Debord, the nonmoving party. See Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 710
F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir.2013). It is true that Debord separately
moved for summary judgment, but that was against Weaver's
counterclaim for defamation, a claim that is not before us in this
appeal.
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B. Debord's Facebook Posts and Mercy's Response
Mercy's management first received notice of this
behavior on July 6, 2009, through a publicly available
message on Facebook, a website for social networking. Earlier that day, Weaver had criticized Debord
and then attempted to hug her. Angered by Weaver's
comments, Debord logged onto Facebook and wrote
several posts during work hours. The relevant posts
said,
(At 9:00 am) Sara DeBord loves it when my
boss adds an extra $600.00 on my paycheck
for hours I didn't even work . . . awesome!!
(At 1:37 pm) Sara DeBord is sooo disappointed
.. . can't believe what a snake my boss is . . .
I know, I know everyone warned me:(
(At 2:53 pm) Oh, it's hard to explain. . . . basically, the MRI tech is getting paid for doing
MRI even though he's not registered and myself, nor the CT tech are getting paid for our
areas . . . and he tells me 'good luck taking it
to HR because you're not supposed to know
that' plus he adds money on peoples checks if
he likes them (I've been one of them) . . . and
he needs to keep his creapy hands to himself
. . . just an all around d-bag!!
Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
Many of Debord's co-workers saw these posts,
including Weaver. Later that day, Debord met with
Mercy's HR Director, Eric Ammons, to discuss a
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gender-based pay-disparity claim that Debord had
recently raised. Weaver interrupted the meeting to
confront Debord about the posts. Ammons asked if
Debord authored them, but she denied it.

Then

Weaver brought his laptop to show Ammons exactly
what the posts said. Even though they appeared on
Debord's Facebook page, Debord again denied writing
them. She explained that anyone could access her
Facebook page from her cellular phone, and because
she left her phone unattended at times, someone else
could have created the posts.
After Weaver left the meeting, Ammons asked
Debord about the post that mentioned extra money
on her paycheck, and Debord claimed that Weaver
had in fact added money to her paycheck around
Thanksgiving of 2006 or 2007, and that when she
brought it to his attention, he did not correct the
overpay. Ammons began investigating this overpay
allegation.
Two days later, on July 8, Ammons again met
with Debord about the Facebook posts. For a third
time, she denied making the posts, so Ammons explained that Mercy would have to spend a lot of
money to find the real culprit unless she confessed.
Debord finally owned up to her conduct, and Ammons
informed her she would be suspended for one day
without pay for "[f]ail[ing] to conduct yourself in a
manner consistent with a high degree of personal
integrity and professionalism." Id. at 288.
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Before ending the meeting, Ammons asked about
the "creepy hands" comment at the end of Debord's
posts. Ammons said this comment concerned him
most. Debord then told Ammons that Weaver touched
her and a lot of the women in the department with
his cold hands. Ammons asked if she thought it was
sexual harassment, and she replied that she did not
think so - she just thought that Weaver was a "pervert." Id.

at 233-34. Ammons said that Weaver's

behavior was "inappropriate" and "should never happen," and that he would have Mercy's risk manager,
Lana Brewster, investigate the matter to see if there
was "any potential for sexual harassment." Id. at
166, 234-35. Meanwhile, he continued investigating
Debord's claim that Weaver added money to her
paycheck.

C. Mercy's Investigation
The next day, July 9, Debord met with Brewster.
Brewster said she was there to talk about Debord's
sexual harassment complaint, but Debord denied having made a sexual harassment complaint; she said
she had only answered Ammons's questions. Brewster
asked Debord what she meant by the "creepy hands"
post on Facebook. Debord described Weaver's "daily
touching" of her arm or neck with his cold hands, in
addition to two sexual remarks Weaver had made to
her. Id. at 188-89. Brewster asked Debord if she
wanted to file a formal complaint, but Debord declined. Brewster then told Debord to let her know
if there were any more problems. Debord assured
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Brewster that the touching and comments "probably
wouldn't happen again." Id. at 188.
That same day, Brewster also interviewed a longtime, female employee in Weaver's department. This
employee denied the existence of any hostility or
sexual tension in the department.
Also on that day, Brewster interviewed Weaver.
He did not confirm making any sexual remarks to
Debord but admitted to occasionally touching her and
other employees on the arm to show them how cold
his hands were. Brewster told him "if anything was
going on to cease." Id. at 570. Based on these interviews, she concluded that Weaver had not violated
company policy.

D. Debord's Termination
By July 13, Ammons determined that Debord's
overpay claim was false. He also learned that Debord
was sending messages to other employees in which
she accused Weaver of destroying the overpay evidence. This troubled Ammons because he already told
Debord that the overpay evidence was in his, not
Weaver's, possession. Further, he learned that Debord's
comments about the overpay and the related investigation had disrupted the workday for many hospital
employees. Ammons thus decided, after conferring
with Mercy's CEO and COO, to terminate Debord.
Later that day, he told Debord she was terminated for
disruption, inappropriate behavior, and dishonesty.
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E. Procedural History
Debord filed suit against Mercy for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII,3 and
she filed suit against Weaver for assault and battery.
Weaver counterclaimed for defamation. Following discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted summary judgment against all
claims and required each party to bear its own costs.
See Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 860
F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Kan.2012) (summary judgment);
Aplt.App. 764 (costs). Mercy made a special motion
for costs as a prevailing party, which the court denied.
Debord appealed the judgment on her sex discrimination and retaliation claims against Mercy; Mercy
cross-appealed its denial of costs.4
We turn first to Debord's sexual harassment and
retaliation claims. We conclude with a brief discussion of Mercy's cross-appeal for costs.

3

Debord also filed a complaint with the Kansas Human
Rights Commission (KHRC), but the KHRC did not have jurisdiction over the case because Mercy is a "sectarian employer"
under Kansas employment law. See Aplt.App. 261, 294. See generally Van Scoyk v. St. Mary's Assumption Parochial Sch., 224
Kan. 304, 580 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1978).
4
Weaver's counterclaim and Debord's claims against
Weaver are not before this court.
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II.

Analysis
It is unlawful for an employer to permit sexual

harassment in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49
(1986). It is also unlawful for an employer to retaliate
against an employee for opposing sexual harassment
in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Here, Debord claims Mercy violated both provisions. She claims Mercy permitted sexual harassment
in the workplace, and she claims Mercy terminated
her for reporting it. The district court determined
that Debord did not have enough evidence to merit a
trial on either claim, so the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Mercy on both. We review the
district court's decision de novo. Daniels v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 627 (10th Cir.2012).

A.

Sexual Harassment/Hostile Workplace

An employee who is sexually harassed by a supervisor may have a claim against the employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Meritor, All
U.S. at 66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l). Under Title VII, harassment is actionable only when it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" such that a reasonable person would find the
work environment to be hostile or abusive and the
employee in fact perceived it to be so. Meritor, All
U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399; Faragher v. City of Boca
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Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d
662 (1998).
An employer may be directly or vicariously liable
for a hostile workplace. To show direct employer
liability, an employee must present enough evidence
for a reasonable jury to find that the employer knew
or should have known about the harassment but
failed to stop it. Burlington Indus, v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 758-59, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).
The "should-have-known" formulation is, in effect, a
showing that the employer was negligent in failing to
stop harassment.
Even without a showing of negligence, an employer can still be found vicariously liable for harassment committed by a supervisor against an employee.
To avoid vicarious liability, an employer can take
advantage of an affirmative defense - the Faragher
defense - by showing both that the employer "exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to
eliminate it when it might occur," and that the complaining employee "failed to act with like reasonable
care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards."
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805, 118 S.Ct. 2275.
Debord raises both theories — direct and vicarious
liability. We review each in turn.

1. Direct Employer Liability
"An employer is directly liable for a hostile
work environment created by any employee if the

lia
employer's negligence causes the actionable work environment." Baty v. Willamette Indus., 172 F.3d 1232,
1241 (10th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds by
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). "'An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment
if it knew or should have known about the conduct
and failed to stop it.'" Id. at 1241-42 (quoting Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 759, 118 S.Ct. 2257).

a. Actual Knowledge
Debord admits that Weaver never made his sexual comments or advances in front of Mercy's management, and she admits she never told management
about the harassment. Instead, to prove actual knowledge, she relies on a former employee's complaint to
management about Weaver's touching. The complaint
was made in 2001, but Debord argues that the complaint shows Mercy actually knew of the sexual harassment Debord experienced from 2004 to 2009.
Evidence of the former employee's

complaint

comes from an internal email summarizing the results of the employee's exit interview. On the subject
of Weaver's touching, the email states, "[Weaver]
learned that the cold hands on [sic] is not appreciated." Aplt.App. 650. Nothing more is said on the
subject.
"In determining whether to consider acts alleged
by other employees, we look to '[t]he extent and seriousness of the earlier harassment and the similarity
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and nearness in time to the later harassment. . .
Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1147 (10th
Cir.2008) (quoting Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc'ns,
61 F.3d 777, 783-84 (10th Cir.1995)), abrogated on
other grounds by Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct.
2257, and Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275.
On nearness in time, this prior event cannot
support actual notice. Occurring three years prior to
Debord's arrival, this notice of one instance of potential harassment of someone else cannot, without
more, constitute actual notice of Debord's sexual harassment three years later. As to our requirement
that evidence be produced showing the extent, seriousness, and similarity of the misconduct, not much
can be said to support actual notice either. The record
discloses one employee complained in 2001, but we do
not know where or how often Weaver touched the
employee, nor whether the touching was considered
sexual harassment. And there is no evidence Weaver
made any sexual comments or advances with the
2001 employee, as he purportedly did with Debord.
Ammons's reaction to Debord's complaint also
suggests that Mercy did not know about any sexual
harassment. According to Debord's own testimony,
Ammons was surprised when she told him about
Weaver sexually harassing her, and Ammons had
been working at Mercy since at least the late 1990s.5
5 It is true that, by the time of his deposition, Ammons
knew that Weaver "puts his cold hands on - on other women,
(Continued on following page)
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In sum, Debord does not raise a genuine dispute
about whether Mercy actually knew of her harassment prior to July 2009.

b.

Constructive Knowledge

Debord also fails to present sufficient evidence
showing Mercy should have known about the sexual
harassment before July 2009.
"When a management-level employee has not
been notified," as here, we apply "what amounts to a
negligence standard: highly pervasive harassment
should, in the exercise of reasonable care, be discovered by management-level employees." Tademy, 614
F.3d at

1147 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Obviously, then, to find constructive notice, we first
must find harassment. Harassment has both objective and subjective components. Morris v. City of
Colorado Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 663 (10th Cir.2012).
For the objective component, we look to the "totality
of the circumstances" and "consider[] such factors
as the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." Id. at 664 (internal quotation marks
omitted). For the subjective component, we look to see
other people." ApltApp. 547. But significantly absent from the
record is any indication that Ammons knew of this conduct prior
to Debord's Facebook post on July 6, 2009.
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if the victim perceived the environment to be abusive.
Id. at 665.
After an employee establishes the existence of
harassment, we look to see whether the incidents of
harassment were "so egregious, numerous, and concentrated as to add up to a campaign of harassment
that the employer will be culpable for failure to discover what is going on." Adler u. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,

144 F.3d 664, 675 (10th Cir.1998) (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted); cf. Harsco
Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir.2007).
Only then do we find constructive notice. Adler, 144
F.3d at 675.
Debord claims Weaver touched at least six other
female co-workers. But she provides the statements
of only three co-workers, and these statements do not
demonstrate that incidents of sexual harassment
were "so egregious, numerous, and concentrated" as
to create a jury question on constructive notice. Id.
The three co-workers testified that Weaver showed
them his cold hands by touching their forearms or
necks. But they did not testify that the touching was
sexual harassment; in fact, one explicitly dismissed
Weaver's touching as not "sexual." See Aplt.App. 633.
Although this co-worker considered Weaver's behavior inappropriate after learning about Debord's lawsuit, she testified that, before the suit, "[i]t didn't
seem like [Weaver] was crossing the line." Id. at 635.
And while another testified that the touches were
unwelcome, id. at 642, and a third testified that the
touches made her feel uncomfortable, id. at 612, not
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one of Debord's co-workers said that Weaver had sexually harassed her, nor did any say that she reported
his behavior.
Debord also offered evidence from an employee
who worked under Weaver between 1994 and 1998 —
years before Debord's employment. This former employee testified that Weaver regularly put his cold
hands on her neck, but she also did not report these
episodes to management at the time.
A comparison between this case and Hirase-Doi
is instructive. In that case, we found a genuine factual dispute on constructive notice because the plaintiff introduced evidence showing that "as many as
eight to ten [female] employees" were being sexually
harassed during one male employee's three-month
tenure. 61 F.3d at 784. The male employee made
"persistent requests for sex and inquiries of [female
employees'] sexual conduct," as well as "open-ended
invitations to all female employees to satisfy his
sexual desires" and "threatening and intimidating
stares." Id. at 780. Worse, he "passed a sexually explicit note," "attempted to kiss [another] on the neck
and brushed her breast with his hand," and "grabbed
[yet another female employee] between her legs." Id.
at 781. By contrast, the allegations in this case do not
constitute a similar "campaign of harassment" blatantly obvious to management. Adler, 144 F.3d at 675.
In sum, the sexual harassment borne out by
Debord's evidence does not rise to the level of "egregiousness" and "pervasiveness" that creates a genuine
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dispute on constructive notice. Tademy, 614 F.3d at
1147.
We now turn to whether Mercy may nevertheless
be vicariously liable for Weaver's behavior.

2.

Vicarious Liability

"An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee."
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275. But when
no tangible employment action is taken, as here, an
employer may defeat liability by showing it took reasonable steps to avoid a hostile workplace by adopting
policies available to employees to report harassment
— the Faragher defense. See id.
The Faragher defense "comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir.2011) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). These two elements are designed to "encourag[e] forethought by
employers and saving action by objecting employees."
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275.
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a. First Element - Prevention and
Correction
The first element of the Faragher defense "actually imposes two distinct requirements on an employer":

"(1)

the

employer

must

have

exercised

reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and
(2) the employer must have exercised reasonable care
to correct promptly any sexual harassment that
occurred." Helm, 656 F.3d at 1288 (citing Pinkerton v.
Colo. Dep't of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1062 (10th
Cir.2009)).
Prevention. "[An] employer[] act[s] reasonably
as a matter of law [to prevent harassment if it]
adopted valid sexual harassment policies [and] distributed those policies to employees via employee
handbooks, [even if it] either provided no sexual harassment training or provided training only to managers." Id. at 1289. In Helm, the employer's policy
"prohibit[ed] sexual harassment, contain[ed] a complaint procedure and [a] list of personnel to whom
harassment may be reported, and include[d] an antiretaliation provision." Id. at 1288. The employer then
"distribut[ed] that policy to all employees via an employee handbook, requir[ed] employees to acknowledge in writing their understanding of the policies
contained in the handbook, and provid[ed] training to
managers regarding the sexual harassment policy."
Id. at 1289. We concluded that the Helm employer's
sexual harassment policy was "a reasonable mechanism for prevention." Id. at 1290 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Debord does not challenge the content or distribution of Mercy's sexual harassment policy. Rather,
she says the fact that Weaver sexually harassed her
shows the inadequacy of Mercy's efforts to prevent
sexual harassment. But a plaintiff must do more than
merely allege harassment to defeat this element of
the Faragher defense. Otherwise, the Faragher defense would not work.
Given this obstacle, Debord also argues that
Mercy's policy is "per se ineffective" because one manager, Brewster, testified that the policy prohibits only
"intimate touching." Aplt. Br. at 36; Reply Br. at 7.
But Brewster's testimony was not that Mercy's policy
prohibited only intimate touching. Rather, in discussing Mercy's sexual harassment policy, Brewster verified that the policy prohibited a range of conduct,
including "discuss[ing] sexual activities, tell[ing] offcolor jokes, and touch[ing] unnecessarily." Aplt.App.
566. Brewster then testified that "[i]f it were intimate
touching," she would consider the conduct a violation
of the policy. Id. And, in fact, Mercy treated Debord's
allegation of unwanted touching as an allegation of
sexual harassment.
Mercy has shown that it "adopted valid sexual
harassment policies [and] distributed those policies to
employees via employee handbooks." Helm, 656 F.3d
at 1289. The prevention component of the Faragher
defense does not require more.
Correction. The second requirement is whether
an employer can "show that it acted reasonably
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promptly on [an employee's] complaint when it was
given proper notice of her allegations as required
under its complaint procedures." Id. at 1290 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Obviously, the "most significant immediate measure an employer can take in
response to a sexual harassment complaint is to
launch a prompt investigation to determine whether
the complaint is justified." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
No genuine dispute exists here that Mercy's corrective measures were sufficient. As outlined above,
Mercy acted "reasonably promptly" after learning of
Debord's allegations on July 8 by launching an immediate investigation. As soon as he learned of Debord's
allegations, Ammons referred the matter to Brewster,
and Brewster promptly investigated the allegations.
Debord claims that is not enough. She claims
Brewster acted unreasonably because (1) Weaver was
not disciplined, (2) Brewster did not believe that
Debord made a sexual harassment complaint in the
first place, and (3) Brewster misled Debord into
thinking there was an actual complaint form when no
such form existed. Thus, says Debord, Mercy's efforts
were insufficient to correct sexual harassment.
Debord's arguments do not raise a genuine dispute of material fact. First, corrective action does not
always require discipline. Cf. Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at
1062-63 (finding "no genuine issue left" on whether
the employer promptly corrected a harassment claim
where "[t]he alleged harassment . . . ceased — without

20a
resuming — after [the] complaint," the plaintiff did
not then request any immediate corrective action, the
employer launched a prompt investigation anyway,
and the matter was resolved "in a matter of weeks").
Second, Brewster investigated Debord's complaint,
even though Debord denied making a sexual harassment complaint at the time. And third, Debord did
not need a written form; she had Mercy's HR Director
(Ammons) and risk manager (Brewster) asking her to
file a complaint, and she declined their offers. No
genuine issue of material fact remains as to the adequacy of Mercy's corrective measures.

b. Second Element - Unreasonable
Delay
An employer may satisfy the second element of
the Faragher defense "by showing that the victimized
employee unreasonably delayed in reporting incidents
of sexual harassment." Helm, 656 F.3d at 1291.
The district court correctly concluded that Mercy
meets the second element. In Pinkerton, we found "a
reporting delay of approximately two or two and a
half months" unreasonable where the plaintiff's only
explanation was a "generalized fear of retaliation,"
and the plaintiff "had received the harassment training and knew that the incidents should have been
reported." 563 F.3d at 1063-64. Here, the reporting
delay spanned five years — Debord did not report the
harassment from 2004 until 2009 — and that amount
of delay is unreasonable.
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Debord's explanation for her delay is (1) she did
not know it was harassment at the time, and (2) she
thought the complaint would have been futile because
Weaver's wife was one of the hospital's two surgeons.
Debord's first explanation suggests either that
Weaver's behavior was not harassment at all (because
Debord did not subjectively experience it as harassment) or that Debord unreasonably failed to consult
the sexual harassment materials provided to her by
Mercy. Either way, this explanation does not justify
her failure to report Weaver's behavior to management.
Her second explanation is also inadequate. A failure to report harassment cannot be excused merely
because the accuser believes the report will be futile;
the accuser's belief must be reasonable. But saying
that the accused's spouse is also employed by the
hospital - without more - does not establish objective
futility. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp.,
240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir.2001) ("We cannot accept
the argument that reporting sexual harassment is
rendered futile merely because members of the management

team

happen

to

be

friends.").

Besides,

Debord does not dispute that Mercy offered an anonymous reporting system, and Debord has not offered
a reasonable explanation for failing to use even that.
Nor does she show any evidence that action would not
be taken; to the contrary, her reports to HR prompted
an immediate response.

22a
In sum, Mercy cannot be held vicariously liable. Debord stayed silent even after Mercy provided
sexual harassment training, annual reminders, an
open-door policy with the management team, and an
anonymous hotline to report harassment. Her sexual
harassment claim fails to raise a disputed, material
fact.
We now turn to Debord's retaliation claim.

B. Retaliation
Debord also claims Mercy fired her as retaliation
for her complaint about sexual harassment in the
workplace. Where, as here, the plaintiff does not have
direct evidence of retaliation, we follow the three-step
framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
First, Debord must present a prima facie case for
retaliation. Next, Mercy must respond with "legitimate, nonretaliatory reason[s]" for Debord's termination. Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987,
998 (10th Cir.2011). Then Debord must show that
Mercy's stated reasons were pretextual. Daniels, 701
F.3d at 639.
Like the district court below, we assume without
deciding that Debord made a prima facie case for
retaliation. And Debord does not dispute that Mercy
proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for terminating her. Rather, Debord claims that Mercy's proffered reasons are mere pretext for Mercy's actual
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intention to punish her for reporting sexual harassment.
"To show pretext, [Debord] must produce evidence

showing weakness,

implausibility,

inconsis-

tency, incoherency, or contradiction in [the employer's]
stated reasons, such that a reasonable jury could find
them unconvincing." Id. "Tn determining whether the
proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they appear to the person making
the decision,' " not as they appear to the plaintiff.
Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir.2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). And we do not ask "whether the employer's
proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct"; we ask
only "whether [the employer] honestly believed those
reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs."
Id. at 1094 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ammons's stated reasons for terminating Debord
were her inappropriate, disruptive behavior and her
dishonesty. Debord does not dispute these charges.
She admits posting inflammatory material about her
supervisor on the internet, sending text messages to
co-workers bad-mouthing her supervisor (unrelated
to the alleged sexual harassment), discussing the
overpay and harassment investigations with others,
knowingly pocketing overpayment in 2007, and thrice
lying about posting information on Facebook while at
work. No reasonable jury could find these reasons
"unconvincing." Daniels, 701 F.3d at 639. Thus, no
reasonable jury could find pretext.
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Debord's many arguments to the contrary do not
raise a genuine dispute of material fact. She argues
that (1) Ammons willfully ignored evidence of her
2007 overpay, (2) Ammons could not lawfully terminate her for using Facebook to air her complaints,
(3) Ammons's stated reasons for her termination are
vague and subjective, (4) Ammons could not lawfully
terminate her for making a false sexual harassment
claim, (5) Ammons could not lawfully terminate her
for communicating with others about the pending
investigations, and (6) Mercy's management failed to
investigate her sex-based pay-disparity claim.
First, Debord claims Ammons willfully ignored evidence showing that she had been overpaid. Ammons
testified - and Debord does not dispute — that he
reviewed call-back logs and pay stubs from 2006, and
they do not show overpay. Therefore, as of July 13,
2009 (the date of Debord's termination), he reasonably believed that Debord's overpay claim was false.
This belief was one reason that Ammons cited for why
he considered Debord to have been dishonest.
Months

later,

however,

Mercy's

management

discovered that, according to the logs and pay stubs
for 2007, Debord had in fact been overpaid. Debord
argues that Ammons's failure to review the 2007
documents demonstrates pretext.
But Debord does not dispute that she mentioned
only 2006 at her second meeting with Ammons, the
July 8 meeting - two days after she first told him
"2006 or 2007." Aplt.App. 463. At most, this evidence
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suggests Ammons's failure to review documents from
2007 resulted from negligence, forgetfulness, or confusion - not intentional ignorance to hide a retaliatory motive against Debord for her sexual harassment
complaint.
Second,

citing Kasten v.

mance Plastics Corp.,

U.S.

Saint-Gobain Perfor, 131 S.Ct. 1325,

179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011), Debord argues that terminating her for her post on Facebook was per se unlawful
because that was her way of reporting sexual harassment.6 And she says Mercy made up this reason
post hoc anyway because her termination slip does
not specifically reference those posts.
In Kasten, the Supreme Court held that the antiretaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), protects oral as well as written
complaints. The Court therefore reversed summary
judgment for the employer where the employee orally
called attention to unlawful practices, and where,
significantly here, the employee did so "in accordance
6

In a footnote, she also cites Gresham v. City of Atlanta,
No. 1:10-CV1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601022 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 29,
2011) (magistrate judge's recommendation), and Mattingly v.
Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.DArk.
Nov. 1, 2011), saying these decisions show that "similar complaints on Facebook . . . deserve protection." Aplt. Br. at 49 n. 3.
But these unpublished opinions address First Amendment protection for Facebook posts related to matters of a public concern.
These decisions are therefore irrelevant to this case, as Debord
neither has raised a First Amendment claim nor has argued that
her posts are related to a matter of public concern.
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with [the employer's] internal grievance-resolution
procedure." Id. at 1329. The Court later observed that
"it is difficult to see how an employer who does not (or
should not) know an employee has made a complaint
could discriminate because of that complaint." Id. at
1335 (emphasis in original).
Under the logic of Kasten, Debord's sexual harassment complaint - i.e., her Facebook post - falls
short. Her Facebook post was not in accordance with
Mercy's otherwise flexible reporting system for sexual
harassment complaints, and the post, by itself, did
not provide any notice to Mercy. Only when Weaver
himself brought the post to Ammons's attention did
Mercy learn that, among many other complaints,
Debord disliked Weaver's "creepy hands." And even
then, Debord thrice denied authoring the post. No
jury could conclude that Mercy's management acted
unreasonably in response to Debord's Facebook post.
Cf. Helm, 656 F.3d at 1291 (concluding it was "entirely reasonable" not to investigate allegations of
sexual harassment when the plaintiff told her employer she "did not wish to pursue her complaint").
Besides, Ammons's decision to terminate Debord
did not turn on whether she aired her grievances
on Facebook; instead, the decision turned on her dishonesty about authoring the posts while at work and
her disruptive behavior during the investigation.
Debord cannot dispute that dishonesty is a valid
ground for terminating an employee. Nor can she
genmnely dispute that she behaved inappropriately
and disruptively by, for example, sending messages
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to co-workers about confidential investigations in contravention of Mercy's policies.7
Third, Debord says that Ammons's stated reasons for terminating her are vague and subjective and
therefore point to pretext. But the "dishonesty" here
is not subjective at all, as Debord already conceded
she lied. And "inappropriate and disruptive behavior"
is not vague, given the context.
Nor do the cases Debord cites demand a different
result. In Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d
1108 (10th Cir.2007), for example, the employee's evidence of pretext was that the investigation into her
misconduct focused on whether or not she had been
rude to a customer. This, the employee argued, was
subjective and hence pretextual. We disagreed. We
noted that "the existence of subjective criteria alone
is not considered evidence of pretext." Id. at 1120. We
then affirmed summary judgment for the employer
because the employee did not present evidence that

7

Debord contends that Ammons was inconsistent about
when he told her to keep the matter confidential and that a call
log shows he is not telling the truth. But Ammons consistently
testified that he called Debord before she sent text messages; it
is Debord who said he did not call until after she sent the messages. And we cannot deduce from the numbers in the call-log
exhibit who called whom. In any event, the record shows that
Ammons told Debord to keep the investigation confidential, and
later he learned that Debord sent co-workers text messages
about the investigation anyway. Because we decide pretext based
on what Ammons knew at the time, we cannot say these arguments raise a jury question.
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similarly situated employees were treated differently,
nor did she present evidence that others in management "deliberately withheld information" or otherwise misled the decisionmaker. Id. Likewise, Debord
has not shown that similarly situated employees were
treated differently or that Brewster withheld information from or otherwise misled Ammons.
In the other case Debord cites, Hurlbert v. St.
Mary's Health Care Sys., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.2006),
the plaintiff's termination slip omitted the reasons
for his termination, and the plaintiff's termination
process conflicted with the employer's usual practice.
See id. at 1298-99. By contrast, here, Debord's termination slip contained the reasons for her termination,
and she has not shown that Mercy deviated from its
usual disciplinary practices.
Fourth, citing an Eighth Circuit case, Debord
says Mercy is not entitled to summary judgment
when one of Ammons's reasons for terminating her
was the falsity of her sexual harassment complaint.
See Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir.2011).
In Pye, the Eighth Circuit found a genuine issue
of material fact when the employer's sole reason for
terminating the plaintiff was the plaintiff's complaint of racial discrimination in the workplace. See
641 F.3d at 1021. But here, Ammons had a number of
reasons — unrelated to Debord's complaint of sexual
harassment - to support his conclusion that Debord's
behavior was inappropriate, disruptive, and dishonest.
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Fifth, Debord argues that terminating her for her
disruptive text messages was pretextual because she
was merely communicating about a pending investigation into harassment. She points to Loudermilk v.
Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312 (7th Cir.2011), where the
employer terminated the plaintiff for taking photographs at work. The Seventh Circuit concluded the
employer evinced a retaliatory motive. The court reasoned, "If . . . Loudermilk snapped the photos [in
order] to bolster his claim of discrimination, then forbidding picture-taking looks a lot like an attempt to
block the gathering of evidence during an investigation." Id. at 315.
Here,

instead

of trying

to

gather

evidence,

Debord's text messages merely shared information
with co-workers about an investigation that company
policy dictates should be confidential. For example,
Debord sent: "[Weaver] emptied out the drawer where
all the call back papers were kept at work. Guilty
as charged!" Aplt.App. 301. And: "To get rid of them.
He's being investigated . . . but he doesn't know it.
[Ammons] will be calling the techs . . . asking about
his conduct . . . the lewd comments and t[]ouching."
Id. at 302-03. Debord is not gathering evidence with
these messages.
Further, unlike the employer's no-photography
rule in Loudermilk, Mercy's confidential-investigation
rule was not generated after the fact. In fact, the rule
is stated in Mercy's harassment training materials.
Debord had received this training, the materials were
available online, and Debord does not allege that this
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policy was only selectively enforced. Debord cannot
show pretext here.
Sixth and finally, Debord claims Mercy failed to
investigate Debord's allegation that a male co-worker
made more money than she did. But Debord did not
raise this argument before the district court, so
we will reverse only if Debord "shows the district
court's decision amounted to plain error." Somerlott v.
Cherokee Nation Distribs., 686 F.3d 1144, 1148 (10th
Cir.2012). This Debord cannot do, because she did not
present evidence that her pay-disparity complaint
was ignored. Instead, she admitted that "the reason"
Ammons first agreed to meet with her on July 6 was
to discuss her claim of disparity in pay, Aplt. Br. at
52, and that shows good faith on Ammons's part, not
pretext.
In sum, it is not reasonable to conclude Ammons
fired Debord because she exercised her right to report
sexual harassment. There were many nonretaliatory
reasons for terminating Debord, and Mercy's management investigated the sexual harassment complaint even when Debord did not pursue the claim
herself. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment for Mercy.

C.

Cross-Appeal: Costs

After granting summary judgment against all
claims, the district court, without explanation, ordered each party to bear its own costs. Having completely prevailed, Mercy filed a post-judgment motion
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for costs. The court denied the motion because codefendant
Debord,

Weaver

and

lost

his

counterclaim

against

Weaver and Mercy shared

counsel.

Mercy cross-appeals for costs.
Debord

contends

that

Mercy's

post-judgment

motion was untimely. Before the district court, Mercy
styled its motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or
amend a judgment. But as Debord points out, the
Supreme Court declared in Buchanan v. Stanships,
Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 108 S.Ct. 1130, 99 L.Ed.2d 289
(1988), that a motion for costs "does not seek 'to alter
or amend the judgment' within the meaning of Rule
59(e). Instead, such a request for costs raises issues
wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of
action, issues to which Rule 59(e) was not intended to
apply." Id. at 268-69, 108 S.Ct. 1130. Thus, according
to Debord, Mercy's motion should be treated as a Rule
54(d)(1) motion, and as such, it had to be filed 7 days
after the clerk's entry of judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.R
54(d)(1) ("[Cjosts . . . should be allowed to the prevailing party. . . . The clerk may tax costs on 14 days'
notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the
court may review the clerk's action."). Because Mercy
filed its motion 21 days after the entry of judgment,
Debord concludes the motion was untimely.
We need not decide the timeliness of Mercy's
costs motion because, even if the motion was untimely, the district court had discretion to consider it.
See Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th
Cir.2005) ("We review for abuse of discretion a district
court's decision whether or not to consider such an
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untimely motion.")- And here, the court properly
exercised that discretion. We presume a prevailing
party is entitled to costs. Zeran v. Diamond Broad.,
Inc.,

203 F.3d 714, 721-22 (10th Cir.2000). Thus,

while the district court may still withhold costs from
a prevailing party, the court must provide valid reasons for doing so. Id. When a district court denies the
prevailing party costs without explanation, we vacate
the costs decision and remand for an explanation
or reconsideration. See, e.g.,

Utah. Animal Rights

Coal. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 566 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th
Cir.2009). And here, in its original judgment, the
court did not explain why it denied costs to Mercy.
Therefore, for efficiency's sake, it was proper for the
district court to rectify that omission by responding to
Mercy's post-judgment motion for costs.
That said, the district court's reasons for denying
Mercy costs were invalid. "[T]o deny a prevailing
party its costs is 'in the nature of a severe penalty,'
such that there 'must be some apparent reason to
penalize the prevailing party if costs are to be denied.'" Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174,
1182 (10th Cir.2011) (quoting Klein v. Grynherg, 44
F.3d 1497, 1507 (10th Cir.1995)). Thus, the district
court's discretion to deny the prevailing party costs
is "not unlimited." Cantrell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 458 (10th
Cir.1995) (en banc). The circumstances in which a
district court may properly deny costs to a prevailing
party include when (1) the prevailing party is "only
partially successful," (2) the prevailing party was
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"obstructive and acted in bad faith during the course
of the litigation," (3) damages are "only nominal,"
(4) the nonprevailing party is indigent, (5) costs are
"unreasonably high or unnecessary," or (6) the issues
are "close and difficult." See id. at 459.
The district court here offered none of those
reasons. Instead, relying on our decision in Roberts v.
Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir.1990), the court
reasoned that denying costs to Mercy is appropriate
because "'both parties have "prevailed" on at least
one claim,'" which, according to the district court,
happened here because Debord prevailed against
Weaver's counterclaim, even though she lost all her
claims against Mercy and Weaver. Aple.App. 1014
(quoting Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1058). The court further
reasoned that separating Mercy and Weaver's defense
costs from Weaver's counterclaim costs would have
been "impracticable" given that Mercy and Weaver
shared

counsel

and

relied

on

overlapping facts.

Aple.App. 1015.
These reasons do not justify withholding costs
from Mercy. The court's reliance on our decision in
Roberts is misplaced, because in Roberts, we upheld
a costs award to a prevailing defendant where it
prevailed "on the vast majority of issues and on the
issues truly contested at trial." 921 F.2d at 1058.
Here, by contrast, Mercy prevailed on all issues, and
yet the district court denied Mercy costs. While
perhaps applicable to Weaver, Roberts does not apply
to Mercy.
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The district court's other reasons are not supportive either. We do not want to discourage an efficient
allocation of resources, so merely sharing counsel
with a co-defendant who files an unsuccessful counterclaim does not make a fully prevailing party ineligible for costs. And overlapping facts may justify
deducting some costs during the taxing process, but it
is not a basis for altogether denying a prevailing
party costs. After all, Debord brought Weaver into the
case as a codefendant, and Weaver chose to bring a
counterclaim; Mercy had no say, as far as we can tell,
in either decision.
In sum, the district court did not provide an adequate basis for refusing costs to Mercy.

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order
of the district court granting summary judgment to
Mercy, and we REVERSE the entry of judgment requiring each party to bear its own costs and REMAND to provide Mercy with an opportunity to
submit a bill of costs consistent with this opinion.
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Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SAM A. CROW, Senior District Judge.
This case comes before the Court on the following
motions for summary judgment: defendant Mercy
Health System of Kansas' (Mercy) motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Sara DeBord's sexual harassment and retaliation claims; defendant Leonard
Weaver's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's
assault and battery claim; and Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment on Weaver's counterclaim for defamation.
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I.

Summary Judgment Standard
On summary judgment, the initial burden is with

the movant to point out the portions of the record
which show that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.1992),
cert,

denied,

506 U.S.

1013,

113

S.Ct.

635,

121

L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts which would
be admissible as evidence from which a rational fact
finder could find in the non-movant's favor. Adler
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th

Cir.1998). The non-movant must show more than
some "metaphysical doubt" based on "evidence" and
not "speculation, conjecture or surmise." Matsushita
Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bones v.
Honeywell Intern., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir.2004).
The essential inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to the jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, All U.S. 242, 251-52, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In applying this standard, all inferences arising
from the record must be drawn in favor of the
nonmovant. Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 331 F.3d 1213,
1216 (10th Cir.2003). Credibility determinations and
the weighing of the evidence are jury functions, not
those of a judge. Id. at 1216. Nevertheless, "the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, 'an inference
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of the existence of each element essential to [her]
case.'" Croy v. COBE Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.3d
1199, 1201 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Hulsey v. Kmart,
Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir.1994)).

11.

Facts
The relevant and admissible facts, construed in

the light most favorable to the Plaintiff follow. Additional facts are set forth in the Court's analysis of the
arguments.
Plaintiff worked in Mercy's radiology department
in Independence, Kansas from March 19, 2004 to July
13, 2009, when she was terminated. She reported
directly to Weaver, who was the director of radiology
from 1996 until October 2010, when he chose to step
down from that position.
Weaver has unusually cold hands and would
often say to Plaintiff and her co-workers "feel my cold
hands," then touch the employees' upper arms or the
back of their necks. Responses to this practice varied.
One employee told Weaver "don't touch me." Another
asked him to keep rubbing, while several said, "your
hands are cold, get them off me." Plaintiff's response
was to pull away. Weaver would sometimes rub
Plaintiff's back, and she would tell him "Stop, that
hurts," although it didn't hurt. Weaver touched Plaintiff approximately three times a week. Plaintiff never
contacted administration to report Weaver's touching,
and Plaintiff knows of no co-employee who did so
during her employment.
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On July 6, 2009, Weaver made negative comments to Plaintiff about her work productivity, which
upset Plaintiff. Later that day, Weaver went to the
room where Plaintiff was working,

put his arm

around her and said, "You know I didn't mean it."
Plaintiff spun away, saying, "You just don't talk to
people like that." This event, which the Court refers
to as a hug for purposes of convenience, is the sole
basis for plaintiff's assault and battery claims.
Later that day, because Plaintiff was upset with
Weaver, she posted statements about him on her
Facebook account. She did so three separate times,
during work hours, via her cell phone, stating:
1. Sara DeBord loves it when my boss adds
an extra $600.00 on my paycheck for hours I
didn't even work . . . awesome!!
2. SB is sooo disappointed . . . can't believe
what a snake my boss is ... I know, I know
everyone warned me.
3. ... he adds money on peoples checks if
he likes them (I've been one of them) . . . and
he needs to keep his creapy (sic) hands to
himself. . . just an all around d-bag!!
(Ellipses in original).
Plaintiff and other employees testified that Mr.
Weaver had a habit of putting his unusually cold
hands on their bare arms or on the back of their
necks. When was asked what she meant by her
"creepy hands" Facebook comment, Plaintiff stated
that it referred to Mr. Weaver's cold hands:
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Q. And in your Facebook posts when you
said "creepy hands," were you intending to
describe something other than cold hands?
A. No. Just that it just gave me the creeps.
I mean, it was such an everyday thing that it
got to where I could be sitting somewhere
and he could come into the area and I
wouldn't even have to look, my skin would
crawl. I just knew he was there.
Plaintiff's depo., p. 198-94 [sic].
Some radiology department employees, including
Weaver, became aware of Plaintiff's Facebook posts
that same day. That afternoon Weaver took the posts
to Eric Ammons, the Director of Human Resources,
who was meeting with Plaintiff about an unrelated
matter. Ammons asked Plaintiff if she had made the
posts, and she denied it. Weaver then brought in his
laptop and showed the posts to them. Ammons asked
Plaintiff a second time if she had made the posts.
Again Plaintiff denied having made them. After
Weaver left, Ammons told Plaintiff that he would
investigate who made the Facebook posts, as well as
her Facebook allegations about Weaver.
On the morning of July 8th, Ammons met with
Plaintiff. He told her if she had made the Facebook
posts, it would be better for her to admit it. Plaintiff
then admitted that she had made the posts, and
Ammons responded that he had already discovered
that. Ammons then told Plaintiff she was suspended
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for one day without pay. Plaintiff's suspension form
states:
Work related conduct needing improvement:
Failure to conduct yourself in a manner consistent with a high degree of personal integrity and professionalism, which is expected
of Mercy coworkers. Engaged in behavior
deemed harmful to a fellow co-worker. Supporting details: See attached Facebook documents. During counseling Sara admitted to
posting information on Facebook.
Ammons depo., p. 5, Exh. C.
After Ammons informed Plaintiff of her suspension, he asked Plaintiff about the "creepy hands"
comment, and Plaintiff replied that Weaver was a
"perv." Ammons asked what she meant by that, and
Plaintiff replied that Weaver had made comments
about her body and would run his hands up inside the
arm of her scrubs and down inside the back neck of
the scrubs. Ammons asked Plaintiff if she considered
that to be sexual harassment, and Plaintiff denied
that it was, saying, "No, he is just a pervert."
Ammons told Plaintiff that because the hospital takes
such matters seriously, he would refer the matter to
Lana Brewster, the risk manager.
Ammons also told Plaintiff that he had the callback papers. Those papers contained the information
which would reveal whether Plaintiff's paychecks
were incorrect, as she had alleged on Facebook. Later
that afternoon, Plaintiff sent five text messages while
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at work to co-employee Tena Walsh, including the
statements: "Leonard emptied out the drawer where
all the call back papers were kept at work. Guilty as
charged. To get rid of them." Ammons became aware
that Plaintiff was talking about the matter in the
department during working hours, and specifically
instructed Plaintiff to keep the matter confidential.
The next day, July 9th, Brewster met with Plaintiff at Ammons' request. Brewster thought that Plaintiff's comment about "creepy hands" might indicate
sexual harassment. Plaintiff denied having made and
wanting to make a formal report of sexual harassment, but said she had made a verbal report
to Ammons. Brewster asked Plaintiff to describe
Weaver's conduct, beginning with the most recent to
the most remote, and Plaintiff did so. Plaintiff told
Brewster of other statements of a sexual nature
that Weaver had made to her throughout the years.
Brewster told Plaintiff to let her know if she had any
more problems. Brewster interviewed Weaver and
Kim Harris, a long-time radiology department employee, before concluding that Weaver had not violated Mercy's sexual harassment policy.
Four days later, Plaintiff was terminated. Ammons
decided to terminate Plaintiff's employment, and
John Woodridge, CEO, and Reta Baker, COO, concurred. Ammons believed that Plaintiff had been
dishonest in denying that she had made the Facebook
posts, in denying that she had made the Facebook
posts while at work, in making unfounded accusations against Weaver about her paycheck, and in
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breaching

confidentiality.

Ammons

believed

that

Plaintiff had been disruptive in openly discussing
the investigation and in texting on the 8th, after
he instructed her to keep the matter confidential.
Ammons told Plaintiff she was terminated for disruption, continued texting, and dishonesty. Plaintiff's
termination form states that she was terminated for
"work related conduct needing improvement: Inappropriate and disruptive Behavior. Dishonest." Dk.
147, Exh. M.
Discovery in this case revealed that in 2007,
Plaintiff had in fact been overpaid approximately
$475 (not $600) for overtime that she had not worked.
This mistake was due to Plaintiff's clock-in error
which Weaver failed to catch in his routine review of
the records. Ammons had looked at records from
2006, but not from 2007, when investigating Plaintiff's Facebook comments about Weaver, but had
found no overpayment. So at the time of Plaintiff's
termination, Ammons

disbelieved Plaintiff's

com-

ment about having been overpaid.
After her termination, Plaintiff sued Mercy for
retaliatory termination, and for sexual harassment.
Plaintiff sued Weaver for civil assault and battery
based on the alleged July 6th hug. Weaver counterclaimed for defamation, based on some statements
Plaintiff made on Facebook and in her text messages,
and similar statements Plaintiff made orally. The
Court first addresses the Plaintiff's Title VII claims
against Mercy for retaliation and sexual harassment,
then addresses the individual's tort claims.
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III. Retaliation
Plaintiff lacks

direct

evidence

of retaliation,

so must meet the three-part test established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to prove retaliation
indirectly.
Under the McDonnell Douglas /indirect approach, the plaintiff must first make out a
prima facie case of retaliation by showing
(1) that [s]he engaged in protected opposition
to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) that a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. If
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the employer must then offer a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for its decision. Finally, once the employer has satisfied this
burden of production, the plaintiff must show .
that the employer's reason is merely a pretext for retaliation.
Tivigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 998
(10th Cir.2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
Defendant challenges the first and third elements of the prima facie case, contending that plaintiff has not shown protected opposition1 or a causal

1

Plaintiff relies, in part, on cases under Title VII's participation clause, rather than the opposition clause. But the pretrial
order includes no claim under the participation clause, and
(Continued on following page)
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connection. The Court assumes, without deciding,
that Plaintiff has made a prima facie case of retaliation. Mercy has offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory
reason for its decision - namely, that Plaintiff was
terminated for her inappropriate and disruptive behavior and her dishonesty. This shifts the burden to
the plaintiff to show that the employer's reasons are
merely a pretext for retaliation. Bryant v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, in which this court held that,
"As a general rule, an employee must proffer evidence
that shows each of the employer's justifications is
pretextual." Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 432
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.2005); Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d
1089, 1093 (10th Cir.2011).

Pretext
To determine whether a proffered reason for a
decision is pretextual, the court examines the facts as
they appear to the person making the decision, not as
they appear to the plaintiff in her subjective evaluation of the situation. Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089,
1093-94 (10th Cir.2011). "The relevant inquiry is not
whether the employer's proffered reasons were wise,
fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those
reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs."
Id.

alleges only protected opposition. See Dk. 141, p. 10, § 6.1 para.
2; id, p. 11, § 6.2 para. 2.
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Plaintiff contends that her statements on Facebook and her texts were true. She thus contends that
she was not dishonest, and that Mercy's finding that
Weaver had not added money to her paycheck was
false. The Court recognizes that falsity evidence is
useful in retaliation cases as one means of establishing pretext. Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1001. But here, the
circumstances cannot lead the trier of fact to reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the
employer was dissembling to cover up a retaliatory
purpose.
The facts show that Ammons believed at the time
of Plaintiff's termination that her paychecks were
accurate. It was not discovered until discovery during
this lawsuit that Plaintiff had, in fact, been overpaid
approximately $475 due to Plaintiff's clock-in error,
which Weaver failed to discover in his routine review
of the records. At the time of Plaintiff's termination,
Ammons had reviewed the call-back logs from 2006,
had determined that those paychecks were in the
correct amounts, and therefore believed that Plaintiff 's statements about her boss having added money
to her paycheck were false. Ammons' failure to review
the records for 2007 which would have revealed the
overpayment, although perhaps erroneous, raises no
inference of pretext.
Plaintiff attacks Ammons' belief that Plaintiff
had been disruptive in openly discussing the investigation and in texting on the 8th, after Ammons
instructed Plaintiff to keep the matter confidential.
Plaintiff contends that Ammons did not tell her to
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keep the matter confidential until after she had sent
the texts, making Ammons' statement false. But even
assuming that Plaintiff is correct, Plaintiff has not
cast any doubt upon the independent reason of given
for her termination - dishonesty.
The facts show that Plaintiff made the Facebook
posts via her cell phone during work hours; that
employees saw and discussed the Facebook posts at
work; that Ammons asked Plaintiff about them; and
that Plaintiff denied having made those posts. Plaintiff lied to Ammons about that fact twice. Further, it
is uncontested that after Ammons told Plaintiff that
he had the call-back logs, Plaintiff told other employees that Weaver had taken and destroyed them. No
facts suggest that Ammons did not reasonably or
sincerely believe that Plaintiff's acts were inappropriate, disruptive, or dishonest. These acts provided
an independent and good faith basis for Plaintiff's
termination, even assuming the truth of her Facebook
statements about her paycheck and the truth of her
version of when Ammons told her to keep the matter
confidential.
Plaintiff's excuses for her dishonest acts are immaterial because in this inqmry, her state of mind
is irrelevant. Nothing in the record suggests that
Ammons did not believe the reasons stated for Plaintiff 's termination. No facts suggest that retaliation
for Plaintiff's complaints of gender discrimination played
a part in the employment decision. Fye v. Okla. Corp.
Comm'n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir.2008). Instead,
Ammons, the primary decisionmaker in Plaintiff's
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termination, was the very person who had initiated
the sexual harassment investigation by referring
Plaintiff's vague complaints to the risk manager just
the week before. Ammons thought Weaver's conduct
was inappropriate, despite Plaintiff's repeated denials to Ammons that she perceived Weaver's acts as
sexual harassment. Because no facts justify an inference that Ammons harbored any retaliatory motive,
summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff's claim
of retaliation.

IV.

Sexual Harassment - Employer Liability
Plaintiff contends that Weaver sexually harassed

her at work over the course of her employment with
Mercy. In support of her hostile work environment
claim, she offers evidence, some of which Mercy contends should be excluded. Mercy additionally contends that Weaver's acts were not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment, and
that in any event, Mercy cannot be held liable for
them. Plaintiff argues that defendant is liable both
vicariously and directly, but raises no alter ego theory.
The Court addresses the issue of employer liability
first, without resolving whether Weaver's alleged harassment of Plaintiff was actionable.

A. Vicarious Liability
Plaintiff does not contend that Weaver's harassment culminated in her termination, or in any other
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tangible employment action.2 Accordingly, the Faragher/
Ellerth defense may be available. The Faragher/
Ellerth framework is designed "to accommodate the
principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by
misuse of supervisory authority," and to accommodate
"Title YII's

equally basic

policies

of encouraging

forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees." Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1285
(10th Cir.2011); quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d
662 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).
Under

the

Faragher/Ellerth

framework,

the

defendant bears the burden to show two elements:
"The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher, 524
U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
Helm, 656 F.3d at 1285. These elements are addressed below.

2

The pretrial order and plaintiff's memo (Dk. 155) contend
that harassment affected the terms and conditions of her employment only, and that retaliation caused her termination.
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1. Employer's Reasonable Care to Prevent
The record reveals that Mercy implemented a
sexual harassment policy that strictly prohibits sexual harassment, contains a complaint procedure listing multiple persons to whom harassment may be
reported, and includes an anti-retaliation provision.
Mercy distributed the policy to all of its employees via
its employee handbook. Mercy trained its employees
on that policy during employment orientation and
during its annual corporate compliance education
program, which it required all employees to attend.
Plaintiff attended

the

orientation training which

included a discussion of the sexual harassment policy,
and received a Power Point presentation each year
from Human Resources. She also completed the corporate compliance program annually, which provided
continuing education on Mercy's sexual harassment
policy. These facts establish, as a matter of law, that
Mercy exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. See Helm, 656 F.3d at 1288-89.

2. Employer's Reasonable Care to Correct
The Court next asks whether the employer acted
reasonably to remedy any harassment that occurred,
despite the reasonable preventative measures.
... in order "to establish that it took proper action to correct harassment, [the defendant] was
required to show that it acted reasonably
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promptly on [plaintiff's] complaint when it
was given proper notice of her allegations as
required under its complaint procedures."
Frederick [u. Sprint/United Management Co.],
246 F.3d [1305] at 1314 [(11th Cir.2001)].
"The most significant immediate measure an
employer can take in response to a sexual
harassment complaint is to launch a prompt
investigation to determine whether the complaint is justified." Swenson v. Potter, 271
F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2001); see also
Cerros [o. Steel Technologies, Inc.], 398 F.3d
[944] at 954 [(7th Cir.2005)] ("Our cases recognize prompt investigation of the alleged
misconduct as a hallmark of reasonable corrective action.").
Helm, 656 F.3d at 1290. Plaintiff contends that this
requirement is not met because Brewster failed to
investigate Plaintiff's allegations of harassment, and
Weaver was not disciplined as a result of Plaintiff's
complaint.3
Plaintiff's Facebook comments did not constitute
"proper notice" sufficient to trigger defendant's duty
to take corrective action. See Helm, 656 F.3d at 129091, and cases cited therein. But even assuming the
contrary, an adequate investigation was timely begun.

3

Plaintiff also contends that this element is not met because Weaver had harassed many employees since 2001. Plaintiff's argument confounds the analysis of vicarious and direct
liability. See Dk. 155, p. 59-61.
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Plaintiff's Facebook posts were made on July 6th,
and Brewster's investigation began on July 9th.
Plaintiff's conversation with Ammons on July
6th, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, arguably provided such notice. Three days later,
Mercy's risk manager, whose responsibility it was to
investigate reports of sexual harassment, initiated a
meeting with Plaintiff to ask about sexual harassment. Ammons had asked Brewster to look at the
matter, and because of the "creepy hands" comment,
Brewster thought she was looking at a sexual harassment complaint. When Brewster met with Plaintiff, Plaintiff said she had verbalized a complaint to
H.R. against Weaver, but did not want to file a formal complaint. Brewster asked Plaintiff to describe
Weaver's conduct, beginning with the most recent to
the most remote, and Plaintiff did so. Brewster told
Plaintiff to let her know if she had any more problems. Brewster also interviewed Weaver, who denied
the bulk of Plaintiff's allegations but admitted putting his cold hands on employees. Brewster told
Weaver "if anything was going on, to cease." Brewster
depo. p. 36-37. After speaking with Plaintiff, Brewster
interviewed a long-time radiology department employee, Kim Harris, who did not confirm any hostility
or sexual tension in the department. Brewster concluded that Weaver had not violated company policy.
Because the investigation was adequate and did
not reveal that Weaver was sexually harassing Plaintiff or other employees, Mercy's failure to discipline
Weaver or terminate his employment does not show
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lack of reasonable care. The Court finds that Mercy
acted reasonably and timely to remedy any harassment of which it was aware.

3.

Plaintiff's Failure to Use Preventive
or Corrective Opportunities

The Court next examines whether Mercy has met
its burden to show that the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. "[T]he law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing and an employer cannot be expected to correct harassment unless the
employee makes a concerted effort to inform the employer that a problem exists." Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc.,
180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff contends that Weaver's sexual harassment of her began in 2004 and continued
throughout her employment, but she concedes that
she never reported Weaver's acts before July 6, 2009.
This delay, if unexplained, is unreasonable, given
Plaintiff's awareness of her ability to report harassing conduct.
Plaintiff first argues that her failure to report
earlier was reasonable because she had "objective
fears of significant retaliation for complaining." Dk.
155, p. 62. But the record fails to show any objective
basis for such a fear. Mercy had an anti-retaliation
policy, and Plaintiff shows no facts suggesting that
this policy was not enforced. For purposes of this
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affirmative defense, a generalized fear of retaliation
simply is not sufficient to explain even "long delays"
of two to four months in reporting sexual harassment.
Pinkerton v. Colorado Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052,
1063

(10th Cir.2009).

Here,

Plaintiff delayed for

approximately five years before she arguably reported
Weaver's acts.
Plaintiff also contends that she believed any
report would be futile because Mercy "also employs
Weaver's wife . . . who is one of only two surgeons at
this small-town hospital." Id. But this fact is not part
of the record, since it is not included in either party's
uncontroverted statement of fact.4 Even considering
that evidence, however, and viewing it in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, the testimony establishes only that Weaver's wife was employed as one of
Mercy's two general surgeons on the date of Plaintiff's deposition. Without showing that Dr. Herrin
was employed by Mercy from 2004 through 2009,
Plaintiff's futility argument lacks an essential link.
Plaintiff believes that reporting Weaver's conduct
would have been useless because if Weaver were
terminated, his wife, Dr. Herrin, would leave the
hospital, and Mercy would not want to lose her. Depo.
Vol. 1, p. 195. But Plaintiff shows no factual basis
for speculating that Mercy would ignore a sexual

4

See D. Kan. R. 56.1(b)(2). Plaintiff cites this record in improperly attempting to controvert Defendant's facts, but does not
include it in her own statement of material facts.
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harassment complaint against Weaver, or that Dr.
Herring would leave Mercy if Weaver left. Plaintiff
admits no one ever told her this would happen, and
she provides no factual basis for her belief. "An
employee's subjective belief in the futility of reporting
a harasser's behavior is not a reasonable basis for
failing to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. See
Lissau [d. Southern Food Service, Inc.], 159 F.3d [177]
at 182 [(4th Cir.1998)]." Barrett v. Applied Radiant
Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir.2001).
Because Mercy has presented undisputed evidence establishing that it acted reasonably to prevent
and to respond to sexual harassment, and that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of its preventive opportunities, Mercy is not vicariously liable
for Weaver's acts.

B. Direct Liability
Plaintiff additionally

contends that Mercy is

directly liable for its own negligence. An employer
may be directly liable if it fails to remedy or prevent a
hostile work environment of which management-level
employees5 knew or should have known. See Adler v.
Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc.,

144

F.3d

664,

673

(10th

Cir.1998). To determine whether an employer is liable
for negligence in allowing employees to engage in
6

Plaintiff does not attempt to show that Weaver was a
management-level employee for purposes of direct liability.
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sexual harassment, this court makes two inquiries:
"first,

into the

employer's

actual

or constructive

knowledge of harassment, and second, into the adequacy of the employer's remedial and preventative
responses to any actually or constructively known
harassment." Adler, 144 F.3d at 673.

1. Actual Knowledge
Actual knowledge will be demonstrable in most
cases where the plaintiff has reported harassment to
management-level employees. Adler, 144 F.3d at 673.
Plaintiff admits that she did not report the alleged
sexual harassment to administration any time before
2009, when Ammons spoke to her about her Facebook
posts.
In contending that Mercy had actual knowledge
of Weaver's acts, Plaintiff points to one event in 2001,
before she was hired.6 Plaintiff believes that a female employee resigned in 2001 because Weaver had
touched her with his cold hands, had made negative
comments about the Catholic religion, and had asked
her if she'd considered artificial insemination. Although evidence of a perpetrator's bad acts toward
other employees may sometimes be useful in imputing knowledge to the employer, this is not such an
occasion.

6

The Court assumes, for purposes of this discussion, that
evidence of this event is admissible.
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The Tenth Circuit requires that such evidence be
similar in nature and near in time. A plaintiff may
rely on the employer's
notice of any evidence of sexual harassment
by [the harasser] that is similar in nature
and near in time to his sexual harassment of
[the Plaintiff] in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the employer] knew or should have known of [the
harasser's] conduct.
Hirase-Doi v.

U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61

F.3d 777, 784 (10th Cir.1995), abrogated on other
grounds as recognized in Zisumbo v. McCleodUSA
Telecommunications Services, Inc., 154 Fed.Appx. 715
(10th Cir.2005). In determining whether to consider
acts alleged by other employees, the Court looks to
"[t]he extent and seriousness of the earlier harassment and the similarity and nearness in time to the
later harassment. . . ." Tademy v. Union Pacific Corp.,
614 F.3d 1132, 1147 (10th Cir.2008), quoting HiraseDoi. But Weaver's harassment of Plaintiff, which
allegedly began in 2004, even if similar in nature, is
not sufficiently near in time to the 2001 event to raise
a triable issue regarding Mercy's actual knowledge of
any hostile work environment to which Plaintiff may
have been subjected, given the lack of intervening
complaints.
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2. Constructive Knowledge
Plaintiff relies

on

a

constructive

knowledge

theory in contending that Mercy had notice of the
sexually hostile environment "[biased solely on the
large number of women who were sexually harassed
by Weaver ..." Dk. 155, p. 59. By this, Plaintiff refers mostly to Weaver's putting his cold hands on coworkers, who never reported that conduct. But only
when the acts of harassment are "'so egregious, numerous, and concentrated as to add up to a campaign
of harassment' " will the employer be liable for failure
to discover the harassment. Adler, 144 F.3d at 675
(quoting Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342,
1346 (10th Cir.1990)). The Court cannot find constructive

knowledge

of sexual

harassment based

solely on the frequency with which Weaver put his
cold hands on employees. "[T]o infer employer knowledge from only the level of pervasiveness essential to
make out a hostile environment claim would be illogical because if that were the rule, knowledge would
be attributed to employers in all cases of hostile work
environment founded on pervasiveness." Ford v. West,
222 F.3d 767, 776 (10th Cir.2000). The facts in this
case fall short of the egregious conduct or campaign of
harassment necessary to impose constructive knowledge on an employer.
Because no question of material fact has been
shown regarding any basis for employer liability,
summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff's sexual
harassment claim against Mercy. Where a court disposes of a claim based on the absence of employer
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liability, it need not resolve, apart from the question
of employer liability, the issue of the presence of a
hostile work environment. See Ford, 222 F.3d 767;
Adler, 144 F.3d at 672.

V.

Civil Assault and Battery
Defendant Weaver moves for summary judgment

on Plaintiff's claim of assault and battery, which is
based solely on the hug defendant Weaver allegedly
attempted to give plaintiff at work on July 6th, 2009.

A. Facts
Defendant denies that he ever attempted to hug
Plaintiff, but admits that the facts, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, show the following:
On July 6, 2009, plaintiff commented to defendant Weaver that she would be doing
mammograms all day and that no one would
see her. Defendant Weaver responded,
"How's that different from any other day? All
you do is sit on your butt in your room."
Plaintiff responded, "I have the highest
productivity the department." When defendant Weaver disagreed, plaintiff replied,
"Are you trying to tell me I'm worthless?" Defendant Weaver responded, "If that's how you
want to put it." Plaintiff went to her work
area and started crying. A little later, defendant Weaver entered the nuclear medicine room, put his arm around plaintiff, and

59a
said, ''You know I didn't mean it." Plaintiff
spun away, saying, "You just don't talk to
people like that." Plaintiff admits that defendant Weaver "didn't fully complete the
hug" due to her evasive actions.
Doc. 155, p. 64.

B. Intent to Harm
"The gravamen of a civil assault and battery is
grounded upon the actor's intention to inflict injury."
Baska v. Scherzer, 283 Kan. 750, 156 P.3d 617 (2007).
Defendant Weaver contends that Plaintiff has failed
to raise a material question of fact on the element of
intent to harm.
Under Kansas law, the tort of assault is defined
as "an intentional threat or attempt, coupled with
apparent ability, to do bodily harm to another, resulting in immediate apprehension of bodily harm."
Taiwo v. Vu, 249 Kan. 585, 596, 822 P.2d 1024 (1991).
See PIK Civ. 4th 127.01. The tort of battery is defined
as "the unprivileged touching or striking of one person by another, done with the intent of bringing about
either a contact or an apprehension of contact, that is
harmful or offensive." PIK Civ. 4th 127.02.
Both parties rely on the following testimony by
Plaintiff, relative to the issue of intent to harm.
"Q. Do you believe he intended to harm
you?
A.

No. I believe he intended to hug me.
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Q. Did you - do you allege that you sustained any damage as a result of the alleged
hug?
A.

Humiliation.

Q.

How long did you feel humiliated?

A.

I still feel humiliated.

Plaintiff's depo., Vol. 2, p. 36.
To the extent that Plaintiff suggests that humiliation is sufficient harm for purposes of these torts,
the Court disagrees. Emotional distress, such as humiliation, does not constitute bodily harm, either
under the plain meaning of those terms, or under
Kansas law. Instead, Kansas cases consistently distinguish between bodily harm, and emotional and
psychological injuries. See e.g.. State v. Reitz, 239 P.3d
114 (2010); Lovitt ex rel. Bahr v. Board of County
Com'rs of Shawnee County, 43 Kan.App.2d 4, 221 P.3d
107 (2009).
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, do not tend to show that defendant
Weaver threatened or attempted to do bodily harm to
Plaintiff. See PIK 127.01 comment (describing an
assault as "an apparently violent attempt, or a willful
offer with force or violence, to do corporal injury to
another,

without the

actual

doing of the

injury

threatened, as by lifting the fist or a cane in a threatening manner"); Taiwo, 249 Kan. 585, 822 P.2d 1024.
Thus summary judgment in defendant's favor is
warranted on the assault claim.
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As for the battery claim, Plaintiff contends that
no showing of intent to do bodily harm is necessary,
since battery includes an unprivileged, intentional
touching, which the recipient finds to be offensive.
Plaintiff contends that because of Weaver's past acts
and comments to her, she considered the hug to be
hostile, offensive, and sexual in nature. But it is the
actor's intent to harm or offend, not merely the recipient's offense, that must be shown. In order to establish a battery under Kansas law, plaintiff must show
"an unprivileged touching or striking, done with the
intent of bringing about either a contact or an apprehension of a contact that is harmful or offensive."
Marten v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 993 F.Supp.
822, 830 (D.Kan.1998). Plaintiff's tortured construction of the elements of battery ignores that the gravamen of a civil assault and battery, unlike a negligence
claim, is grounded upon the actor's intention to inflict
injury. See Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192
Kan. 360, 366, 388 P.2d 824 (1964); Murray v. Modoc
State Bank,

181 Kan. 642, 313 P.2d 304 (1957);

Hackenberger v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., 144 Kan.
607, 610, 611, 62 P.2d 545 (1936); Hershey v. Peake,
115 Kan. 562, 223 P. 1113 (1924). Battery is an intentional tort, and the term "intent," as it is used in the
law of torts, denotes that the actor desires to cause
the consequences of his act, or that he believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it. Baska, 283 Kan. at 757, 156 P.3d 617, citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A(1964).
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Nothing in the facts tends to show that Weaver
intended to offend or harm Plaintiff by hugging her.
When asked whether she believed that defendant
Weaver intended to harm her, Plaintiff replied: "No. I
believe he intended to hug me." Weaver did not testify
about his intent because he denied that the event
occurred. No other circumstances of record suggest
that defendant Weaver harbored any intent either to
harm or to offend Plaintiff by hugging her. Under
Plaintiff's version of the facts, it is reasonable to infer
that Weaver intended only to console her. Summary
judgment in favor of the defendant is therefore appropriate. See Stricklin, 192 Kan. at 366, 388 P.2d
824 (1964); Holdren u.

General Motors Corp.,

31

F.Supp.2d 1279 (D.Kan. 1998).

VI.

Defamation
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Weaver's

counterclaim against her for defamation, contending
that all statements she made were true and that none
of them harmed Weaver's reputation.

A. Facts
Defendant Weaver claims that the following four
statements by Plaintiff were false and defamatory:
1. Facebook Post on July 6, 2009: "Sara
DeBord loves it when my boss adds an extra
$600.00 on my paycheck for hours I didn't
even work . . . awesome!"
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2. Cellular Phone Text Message to coworker Tena Walsh on July 8, 2009: "Leonard
emptied out the drawer where all the call
back papers were kept at work . . . Guilty as
charged!" "To get rid of them."
3. Oral Statement to former co-worker
Heather Boss on July 8, 2009: "Weaver had
destroyed and in fact shredded the callback
logs."
4. Oral Statement to former co-worker
Melissa Stewart in 20 097: "Weaver took the
callback logs from the Radiology Department."
Dk. 141, p. 9; Dk. 139. Weaver believes that these
statements falsely accuse him of two matters: 1) falsifying Plaintiff's time records and intentionally paying her for time she did not work; and 2) removing
the callback papers, which would have accurately reflected the time Plaintiff worked, to hide his guilt.
Under Kansas law, the elements of defamation
are: (1) false and defamatory words; (2) communication to a third person; and (3) harm to the reputation
of the person defamed. Droge v. Rempel, 39 Kan.App.2d
455, 459, 180 P.3d 1094 (2008). The Court focuses
upon Plaintiff's claim that Weaver has failed to show
that any of the allegedly defamatory statements
caused harm to his reputation.

7

Ms. Stewart testified that plaintiff made this statement in
2010, then corrected the date to 2009 on her errata sheet.
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B. Harm to Reputation
"[D]amage to one's reputation is the essence and
gravamen of an action for defamation." Gobin v. Globe
Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982).
Damages recoverable for defamation cannot be presumed but must be proven. Hall v. Kansas Farm
Bureau, 274 Kan. 263, 276, 50 P.3d 495 (2002). "Proof
of such damages typically entails showing that persons were deterred from associating with the plaintiff, that the plaintiff's reputation had been lowered
in the community, or that the plaintiff's profession
suffered." Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929
F.Supp.

1362 (D.Kan. 1996). "[T]he plaintiff in an

action for defamation must first offer proof of harm to
reputation; any claim for mental anguish is "parasitic," and compensable only after damage to reputation has been established." Gobin, 232 Kan. at 7, 649
P.2d 1239. Evidence must permit the jury to determine what plaintiff's true reputation was in the community of his residence, and to determine whether
the publication damaged that reputation. Id. Injury
to one's personal sensitivities is insufficient to show
harm to one's reputation. Id.
In this case, the parties agree that as to the third
statement, allegedly made by Plaintiff to Heather
Boss, Boss has no opinion concerning Weaver's character, other than that he's a nice man. Dk. 145, p. 8,
Dk. 154, p. 6. No evidence shows that Plaintiff's
statement to Boss about Weaver's destruction and
shredding of callback logs damaged Weaver's reputation. Weaver appears to concede as much by his
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failure to address this matter in his response. Because no evidence provides any basis for a jury to find
that this statement damaged Weaver's reputation,
this statement is not actionable.
Weaver contends that the other three statements
damaged his reputation at work. To meet his burden
to show damage to his reputation, Weaver offers testimony that before the statements were made, certain
employees thought positively of him, but that after
the statements were made, they thought differently.
The Court examines this evidence below, focusing on
the requisite causal connection.
Tena Walsh, an employee in defendant's radiology department, was a Facebook friend with Plaintiff.
She saw Plaintiff's Facebook Post on July 6th, which
said: "Sara DeBord loves it when my boss adds an
extra $600.00 on my paycheck for hours I didn't even
work . . . awesome!" She also received the following
text messages from Plaintiff on July 8th: "Leonard
emptied out the drawer where all the call back papers
were kept at work . .. Guilty as charged!" "To get rid
of them."
When asked what her opinion was of Weaver
before seeing the Facebook posts, Walsh testified:
Well, obviously I didn't - you know, creepy
when it comes to women. I can honestly say
there was (sic) times, as far as him being a
boss to me, there was good things that happened too. I mean, he pushed me to go back
and get my schooling and education, so I
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mean, I'll give him credit for that, but this
has gone - this whole line of everything, why
we're here today has gone on far too long,
and unfortunately - I'm allowed to say what
I want to say; correct? Unfortunately, it took
this happening to Sara and her finally doing
something to pretty much bring this all out
for all of us that have ever experienced anything that's gone on for all these years, so —
and it's time he - it's totally unjustifiable, it's
hurt a lot of people, and it's bringing out a lot
of pain in the past for a lot of us. Me in particular, I know.
Walsh depo. p. 45-46.
Walsh was then asked whether her opinion of
Weaver had changed since seeing Plaintiff's Facebook posts and text messages. She replied:
My opinion for him is - I assume he just
wants this to be done and over with. He
doesn't - he doesn't deserve to still be employed with Mercy as far as I'm concerned.
Maybe I don't either. Maybe none of us do.
But it's really hard to see him now when I do
see him, so — . .. I've known him because I
started just a couple months before he did,
and he's got away with this shit for too long.
Got away with this stuff for too long.
Id.
In short, Walsh stated no opinion about Weaver's
reputation. Nothing in her testimony raises an inference
that she believed Weaver was padding Plaintiff's
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paycheck, was a thief, or had destroyed company
records. Her comments about Weaver were based her
own experiences with or observations of him, and on
what she believed to be Weaver's sexual assault of
her outside of work. Her cited testimony fails to show
that Plaintiff's statements may have caused any
change in Walsh's opinion about Weaver, if there was
any such change.
Angie Cessna was also aware of plaintiff's Facebook posts. Weaver cites Cessna's testimony that
before the posts, "everybody probably thought he was
a very nice guy," but now Cessna tries to avoid him
when she visits his department. Cessna depo., pp. 51,
54, 55, 64. But Cessna's testimony states that the
reason she tries to avoid Weaver is because Weaver's
own statements make her feel uncomfortable. Id.,
p. 55. She began avoiding Weaver when he started
making strange comments, which was after Plaintiff's termination. Id., p. 64.
Further, when asked whether her opinion of
Weaver had changed since she became aware of the
Facebook posts, Cessna replied:
No. I find it very funny that — that his character is in question based on a post. I would
be more concerned that his character would
be in question due to the way he acted and
the things he said in the department. That is
- I'm laughing. I mean, that is almost comical to me.
Cessna depo. p. 50. As above, the causal element is
lacking. Nothing in the cited record provides any

68a
basis for a jury to find that plaintiff's Facebook posts
about Weaver damaged Cessna's opinion of him.
Eric Ammons, Mercy's CEO and former head of
human resources, saw the Facebook posts and texts
in the course of his internal investigation about them.
He testified that he still considers Weaver to be "a
person of honesty, a person of integrity." Ammons
depo. p. 58. Ammons does think differently of Weaver
after July of 2009, but that is because Weaver had
difficulty leading the department and voluntarily
stepped down into a staff position. Depo. p. 6162. Ammons believed that Plaintiff's lawsuit made
Weaver an ineffective leader because Weaver is afraid
to counsel employees or take action relating to performance issues. Id., p. 62. Nothing in the cited
testimony suggests that Ammons' opinion of Weaver
changed because of Plaintiff's Facebook posts or
texts.
Additionally, Plaintiff's statements would not have
lowered Ammons opinion of Weaver unless Ammons
believed those statements to be true. But Ammons
investigated Plaintiff's Facebook posts about receiving extra money, and concluded they were not true.
He also knew that Plaintiff's texts were false in
alleging that Weaver had destroyed the call-back logs,
since he had those call-back logs in his possession at
the time.
Melissa Stewart, a former co-worker of plaintiff 's, was a Facebook friend with Plaintiff, but never
saw or heard about Plaintiff's post that Weaver had
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added money to plaintiff's paycheck. She did hear
about Plaintiff's Facebook post saying "at least now
he'll keep his creepy hands off me." Stewart depo.,
p. 12-14. Additionally, Plaintiff told her sometime in
2009 that "Weaver took the callback logs from the
Radiology Department." But Ms. Stewart was not
asked if her opinion of Weaver had changed because
of those statements. Instead, Weaver cites the following testimony as support for claiming damages to his
reputation.
Q. Do you consider Weaver a person of integrity or honesty or morality?
A.

No.

Stewart depo., p. 33. No causal connection is made,
however, between this opinion and Plaintiff's allegedly defamatory comments. Instead, the immediately preceding testimony clarifies that Stewart's
opinion was based Weaver's own acts, not on Plaintiff's comments:
Q. Okay. What is your opinion of Weaver as
a supervisor?
A. I don't think that he should be in a position to supervise employees the way that he
- the way that he is now because I feel like if
you're a supervisor that there's - you should
be concerned with managing your employees
and not trying to be friends with them. I
think he crosses the line a lot with his employees. He's too worried about their personal lives and being friends with them
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instead of the job that he's supposed to be
doing.
Id., p. 33.
Weaver also points to the testimony of Kari
Dunham,

another Mercy employee.

But Dunham

testified that she has no idea what Plaintiff posted on
Facebook, has never seen any text messages about
Weaver, and was not aware that Plaintiff sent text
messages to Tena Walsh. Although Dunham stated
that her opinion of Weaver had changed, that change
was caused by rumors relating to Plaintiff's accusations of assault. Depo., p. 12-13. Her testimony does
not suggest any causal connection between Plaintiff's
allegedly defamatory statements, which do not allege
assault, and damage to Weaver's reputation.
Testimony from Dr. Herrin, Weaver's wife, does
not assist his damages claim. She testified that she
was aware of her husband's reputation generally at
the hospital. She believes he had a good reputation, is
respected and well-liked, and that his reputation had
not changed since Plaintiff made her Facebook posts
or sent her text messages to Tena. Herrin depo. p. 2932. Weaver told her that he didn't feel like he could be
effective as a manager because of the threat from the
Plaintiff's lawsuit, and because of Terri's allegations.
Herrin depo. p. 34.
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The sole remaining admissible testimony8 offered
to show damage to Weaver's reputation is his own
testimony. He stated that he felt like he had lost control of his department partly because of Plaintiff's
statements, but mostly because of another incident.9
Weaver depo. p. 165. He believes that the following
occurred as a result of Plaintiff's Facebook posts:
people at work lost respect for him and no longer
talked to him as much as they did before; he felt he
could no longer effectively manage the radiology department so he chose to step down as its director over
a year later; and Terri Wilson was contemptuous to
him in September of 2009. Id., p. 168-173, 187-191.
No facts show that Terri Wilson's acts were due
even in part to Plaintiff's statements. In fact, Wilson
testified that she has never used Facebook, and no
facts show she was aware of Plaintiff's statements
about Weaver. Wilson's contemptuousness to Weaver,
if any, has not been shown to have been related to the
challenged statements made by Plaintiff.
This leaves the sole proof of damage as Weaver's
belief that people at work lost respect for him and no
longer talk to him as much as they did before. A
8

The Court disregards all hearsay not shown to be justified
by an exception.
9
Allegedly, when employee Terri Wilson refused Weaver's
instruction to do a task, Weaver grabbed her arm and told her to
do it. But the citation is to pages of Wilson's deposition (9-10)
that are not included in the record. See Dk. 155, Wilson depo.,
including pages 1-4 and 45-48 only.
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victim's own observations may be suitable as proof
of harm to his reputation for defamation cases in
Kansas, see Moran v. State, 267 Kan. 583, 985 P.2d
127 (1999), but they must raise a reasonable inference that the damage was caused by the plaintiff's
statements. Yet Weaver fails to name any person who
was aware of Plaintiff's derogatory comments and
who talked to him less, and fails to identify any other
way in which employees demonstrated any loss of
respect for him. "Broad and factually unsupported
allegations ... do not support a claim for damages
for

alleged

defamation."

Kan.App.2d 22, 30,

Davis

v.

Hildyard,

34

113 P.3d 827 (2005) (finding

insufficient proof of damages for defamation where
physician testified that patients had canceled their
appointments).
Summary judgment is warranted on Weaver's
claim of defamation for his failure to prove that any
of Plaintiff's four statements damaged his reputation. The Court finds it unnecessary to reach other
questions, including whether those statements were
substantially true.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant
Mercy Health System of Kansas' (Mercy) motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual harassment
and retaliation claims (Dk. 146) is granted.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that defendant

Leonard Weaver's motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff's assault and battery claim (Dk. 146) is
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granted; and that Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on Weaver's counterclaim for defamation
(Dk. 144) is granted.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SARA C. DEBORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,

Nos. 12-3072 & 12-3109

v.
MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM
OF KANSAS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
and
LEONARD WEAVER,
Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER
(Filed Jan. 16, 2014)

Before

KELLY,

MURPHY

and

TYMKOVTCH,

Circuit Judges.

Sara C. Debord's petition for rehearing is denied.
The petition for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular
active service. As no member of the panel and no
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judge in regular active service on the court requested
that the court be polled, that petition is also denied.
Entered for the Court
/s/ Elisabeth A. Shumaker
ELISABETH A SHUMAKER, Clerk

